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TRUSTS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
ANTITRUST LEGISLATION 
Wayne D. Collins* 
 
Between 1888 and 1890, thirteen states and the federal government 
enacted antitrust legislation criminalizing combinations among competitors 
intended to control prices in the marketplace.  These laws were a reaction 
to the increasing formation of horizontal combinations, large and small, 
throughout the economy in the wake of dramatically changing economic 
conditions since the Civil War.  Through most of this period, combinations 
struggled to find structures that would enable them to operate effectively.  
Simple combinations of independent firms, although neither criminal nor 
tortious, were often undermined because state common law refused to 
enforce the contractual arrangements that would prevent members from 
deviating from the rules that would give a combination the power to control 
price.  Nor could early combinations avail themselves of a unitary 
ownership structure, since state corporation law restricted the corporate 
form in ways that made it largely unworkable as a combination structure.  
In the early 1880s, however, some combinations, beginning with 
Standard Oil, adopted a new form of organization, the trust proper, which 
had the command and control attributes of a corporation without being 
subject to the restrictions of state corporation law.  Shortly thereafter, some 
states, notably New Jersey, liberalized their corporation laws, making 
corporations suitable as a vehicle for housing a business combination.  
States and the federal government responded with legislation that adopted 
the common law prohibitions against combinations in restraint of trade, 
extended these prohibitions to combinations organized as trusts proper and 
holding companies, and criminalized violations in order to enable 
government challenges.  Despite these extensions of the law, early 
enforcement was virtually nonexistent, even against most combinations that 
had achieved widespread public notoriety.  After the turn of the last 
century, however, the new laws set the stage for an aggressive enforcement 
policy following a massive horizontal consolidation movement that began in 
1895. 
  
 
*  Partner, Shearman & Sterling LLP; Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University 
School of Law.  My colleagues Vittorio Cottafavi and John Mellyn, as well as David Merkin 
in the Shearman & Sterling LLP law library, have been extraordinarily tenacious and 
successful in locating many of the sources and economic data used in this Article.  I am in 
their debt, although they bear no responsibility for any errors in the final product. 
 2280 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2280 
I.  A CHANGING ECONOMY:  ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PRIOR TO 1890 ... 2281 
II.  THE “TRUST” MOVEMENT ................................................................. 2288 
III.  FORMS OF COMBINATION AND PRE-ANTITRUST REGULATION ........ 2292 
A.  Simple Combinations .............................................................. 2293 
B.  Pools ....................................................................................... 2307 
C.  Corporations........................................................................... 2309 
D.  Trusts ...................................................................................... 2315 
E.  Holding Corporations and the Liberalization of 
Incorporation Laws ............................................................... 2329 
IV.  THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE ........................................................... 2334 
A.  State Antitrust Legislation ...................................................... 2335 
B.  Federal Antitrust Legislation .................................................. 2339 
V.  SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ................................................. 2342 
INTRODUCTION 
For much of antitrust history, conventional wisdom has held that the 
Sherman Act was passed because of overwhelming popular agitation for 
federal legislation to restore a balance in the marketplace between “big 
business,” on the one hand, and consumers, farmers, and small businesses, 
on the other.  When we examine the actual conditions of the time, the state 
and federal legislative responses to calls for antitrust regulation, and how 
these new statutes were enforced immediately after their enactment, it 
becomes apparent that large firms as such were not a target.  In both the 
years preceding the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, as well as the 
immediate years following its enactment, there was not a single identifiable 
case brought under the common law or the new state and federal antitrust 
laws that challenged an organically grown firm simply because it was big, 
even if it displaced—as many large firms did—smaller competitors.  
Rather, the focus was on the combinations of competitors, whether large or 
small, that were able to raise the prices at which they sold their output (or 
lower the prices at which they purchased their inputs) to an extent regarded 
as injurious to the public interest.  Regardless of their technical legal form, 
these combinations came at the time to be called “trusts.”  This Article 
examines the economic conditions that gave rise to a pervasive number of 
these so-called trusts, the various legal structures in which these 
combinations were housed, and the laws in effect prior to the enactment of 
state and federal antitrust legislation that attempted to regulate them. 
Part I surveys the macroeconomic conditions in the United States in the 
two decades prior to the passage of the Sherman Act.  The years between 
1870 and 1890 were a period of enormous economic growth brought about 
by fundamental changes in transportation, communications, population 
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growth, production technology, business organization, and finance.  During 
this period, the country shifted from a predominately agrarian economy to 
an industrial one. 
Part II examines the microeconomic implications of these changes.  
While for some industries, technological innovations resulted in large 
increases in optimal firm size and significant displacements of smaller, less 
efficient firms, the emergence of large firms and an accompanying increase 
in industrial concentration does not appear to be a motivating factor behind 
the antitrust laws.  Rather, throughout the economy, rapidly expanding 
output, coupled with a broadening market reach, put more firms in 
competition with one another.  This competition, together with the 
monetary policies of the day, resulted in a significant decline in price levels 
and led to what became known at the time as “ruinous” or “excessive” 
competition, that is, competition that prevented producers in the market 
from recovering their costs or at least from earning what they considered a 
fair profit.  In an effort to control excessive competition—and no doubt, in 
most cases, to exercise market power and earn supracompetitive profits—
numerous groups of competitors attempted to coordinate their operations to 
limit competition, curtail output, and return prices to “reasonable” if not 
supracompetitive levels.  This marked the beginning of the “trust 
movement.” 
Part III explores the various means available to competitors to coordinate 
their activities, ranging from simple agreements and pools, to corporations, 
trusts proper, and holding companies.  Regardless of their technical legal 
structure, all of these various vehicles became known colloquially at the 
time as trusts.  This Article also examines the pre–Sherman Act law that 
regulated the use of these legal vehicles, most importantly the common law 
restrictions on contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of 
trade. 
Part IV looks briefly at the thirteen state antitrust statutes and the federal 
Sherman Act that were passed in the brief period from 1888 to 1890 in the 
wake of the nascent trust movement.  All of these statutes had a dominant 
single purpose:  the criminalization of combinations of competitors that 
would have the power to control price in the marketplace.  Although the 
statutory language varies, the import of each of these laws was to adopt (but 
not expand) the substantive common law prohibitions against combinations 
in restraint of trade, to extend these prohibitions to combinations organized 
as trusts proper and holding companies to ensure that they were reachable, 
and to create a criminal cause of action in order to enable government 
enforcement.  Two state statutes and the Sherman Act also provided for a 
private cause of action by injured third parties. 
Part V offers a few concluding observations. 
I.  A CHANGING ECONOMY:  ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PRIOR TO 1890 
Until the 1870s, businesses largely served an agrarian economy, and 
most industrial firms either processed agricultural products or supplied 
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farmers with food, clothing, and farming inputs.  With a few exceptions, 
most notably the railroads and some large textile mills, firms were 
organized as sole proprietorships or partnerships with a single location 
producing a limited line of labor-intensive goods and services.1  For the 
most part, the lack of a reliable, inexpensive, high-speed transportation 
network confined a firm’s operation to the local area and correspondingly 
limited demand for the firm’s product.2  When a business sold in distant 
markets, it did so through commissioned merchants or agents that handled 
the business of multiple firms.3  No cadre of professional managers existed; 
rather, the owners personally managed the business and supervised the 
firm’s few employees.4  Nor was there the financial incentive or 
wherewithal to create large firms.  Production technologies yielding 
significant economies of scale either did not exist or were overshadowed by 
the high costs of broader geographic distribution.5  Markets for raising 
investment capital had yet to emerge, and investment resources were 
limited largely to what a family or a small group of partners were willing to 
invest.6 
Beginning in the 1870s, however, fundamental changes in transportation, 
communications, population growth, production technology, business 
organization, and finance led to rapid economic growth and a shift from a 
predominately agrarian economy to an industrial one.  This shift started 
before the Civil War, but it was particularly pronounced for several decades 
beginning in 1870. 
A rapidly expanding transportation network and declining real freight 
rates made it increasingly possible and economical to reliably ship products 
over long distances for distribution and sale.  This, in turn, enlarged the 
effective geographic area a single firm could serve from its local vicinity to 
regional or even national markets.  After connecting the coasts in 1869 by 
linking the tracks of the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Central 
Pacific Railroad Company at Promontory Point, Utah, the railroads 
increased their track mileage by a factor of three from 52,922 miles in 1870 
to 166,703 miles by 1890.7  But this was hardly the whole story.  Since 
 
 1. See JEREMY ATACK & PETER PASSELL, A NEW ECONOMIC VIEW OF AMERICAN 
HISTORY 191–93 (2d ed. 1994); CHRISTOPHER J. SCHMITZ, THE GROWTH OF BIG BUSINESS IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE, 1850–1939, at 31 (1993). 
 2. See SIDNEY RATNER, JAMES H. SOLTOW & RICHARD SYLLA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMY 183–84 (1979). 
 3. See GLENN PORTER & HAROLD C. LIVESAY, MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS 15–
17 (1971); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Role of Business in the United States:  A Historical 
Survey, 98 DÆDALUS, WINTER 1969, at 26. 
 4. See GLENN PORTER, THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860–1910, at 11–12 (1973).  
 5. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 49 (1977); SCHMITZ, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
 6. See PORTER, supra note 4, at 8; SCHMITZ, supra note 1, at 44. 
 7. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, EARLIEST 
TIMES TO THE PRESENT:  MILLENNIAL EDITION 4-916 ser. Df874 (2006) [hereinafter 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS].  The underlying data for most of the statistics cited in this Article 
come from Historical Statistics, which is widely regarded as collecting the best time series 
statistics available.  Even so, given the problems of systematic data collection as we go back 
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railroads did not have to follow meandering rivers, they could, in many 
cases, cut effective travel distances for bulk transportation by large margins.  
A trip from New York to Philadelphia could take a week to ten days by 
road in 1800, while the same trip took less than a day by rail in the late 
1850s.8  Railroads also were not subject to the vicissitudes of rivers 
freezing over or roads made impassable by rain or snow and could reliably 
deliver passengers and freight in all but the most extreme weather.  Freight 
rates also dropped precipitously.  Nominal freight rates averaged $0.15 per 
ton/mile by road in the 1830s, $0.04 per ton/mile by rail in 1850, and 
$0.015 per ton/mile by rail by 1880.9  
Growing alongside the railroads was an equally expanding 
communications network.  The broadening communications system not 
only permitted the railroads to manage their train traffic but also allowed 
suppliers to better understand and respond to current market conditions in 
distant markets.10  Samuel F.B. Morse built the first electromagnetic 
telegraph demonstration line in 1844, connecting Washington and 
Baltimore.11  By the beginning of the Civil War, the telegraph network was 
essentially nationwide; by 1870, multiplexing allowed multiple telegraph 
messages to be sent simultaneously over the same line.12  For the most part, 
telegraph companies built their lines on the railroad rights-of-way, and most 
communications occurred between railroad stations.13  The early telegraph 
companies, however, were plagued by bankrupting competition between 
parallel lines and incompatible technologies and coordination problems 
when messages were transmitted over the interconnecting lines of different 
operators, so that, by the mid-1850s, they had largely consolidated into six 
major companies.14  In 1857, these six companies, in what became known 
as the “Treaty of the Six Nations,” divided the eastern half of the United 
States among themselves into six disjoint exclusive regions and then 
 
in time, the early statistics in this Article (say, those for years prior to 1900) generally should 
only be considered indicative and not exact.  The notes in Historical Statistics provide the 
underlying source of each data series. 
 8. SCHMITZ, supra note 1, at 11. 
 9. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 4-781 ser. Df17 & Df21.  For more on the 
development of railroads during this period, see ATACK & PASSELL, supra note 1, at 427‒56; 
ROBERT FOGEL, RAILROADS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN ECONOMETRIC 
HISTORY (1964); JOHN F. STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS (2d ed. 1997); ALBERT FISHLOW, 
AMERICAN RAILROADS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ANTE-BELLUM ECONOMY (1965); 
Albert Fishlow, Productivity and Technological Change in the Railroad Sector, 1840–1910, 
in OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER 1800 (Dorothy 
S. Brady ed., 1966), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1578.pdf. 
 10. See Alexander James Field, The Magnetic Telegraph, Price and Quantity Data, and 
the New Management of Capital, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 401, 411 (1992). 
 11. DAVID HOCHFELDER, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA, 1832–1920, at 2 (2012). 
 12. Id. at 2–3, 42–43. 
 13. See CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING, PHYLLIS W. BERNT & MARTIN B.H. WEISS, SHAPING 
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS:  A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS 
41–42 (2006); ROBERT LUTHER THOMPSON, WIRING A CONTINENT:  THE HISTORY OF THE 
TELEGRAPH INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1832–1866, at 203–16 (1947). 
 14. THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 187–202. 
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ultimately consolidated into a single company, Western Union, in 1866.15  
From 1870 to 1890, Western Union increased the miles of wire from 
112,000 to 679,000 and its number of offices from 3,972 to 19,382.16  
During the same period, Western Union increased the number of messages 
it handled more than five-fold from 9.1 million to 55.9 million a year.17  
The telephone, which was invented in 1876, was also rapidly developing.  
By 1890, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, which had 
acquired the patent rights to the telephone, had 332,000 miles of telephone 
lines and 227,900 telephones in operation and handled an average of 
1.4 million local calls daily.18 
Between 1870 and 1890, the U.S. population almost doubled from 
38.6 million to 63.0 million, for a compound average growth rate of 
2.5 percent over the twenty-year period.19  This population growth increased 
both the supply of labor as well as aggregate demand for goods and 
services.  Net immigration during the period was 7.1 million people, or 
about 30 percent of the population growth.20  Increasing population density 
and urbanization also helped to concentrate demand and further reduced the 
costs of serving distant markets.  From 1870 to 1890, the urban population 
more than doubled from 9.9 million to 22.1 million, and rose from 
25.7 percent to 35.1 percent of the total U.S. population.21  The rural 
population, while still increasing from 28.7 million to 40.9 million, declined 
from 74.3 percent to 64.9 percent of the total U.S. population.22  Overall, 
population density increased from 13.0 per square mile in 1870 to 21.2 per 
square mile in 1890.23 
The growth in the economy is also reflected in total energy consumption.  
From 1870 to 1890, energy consumption from fossil fuel sources in the 
United States rose from 1,059 trillion BTU to 4,475 trillion BTU, for a 
compound average growth rate over the period of 7.5 percent.24  Leaving 
fuel wood aside, the vast bulk of energy consumed in the United States 
 
 15. Id. 310–30, 406–26. 
 16. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 4-1001 ser. Dg11 & Dg13.  Thompson is 
the leading authority on the early development of the telegraph. THOMPSON, supra note 13. 
For other treatments, see HOCHFELDER, supra note 11; RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION:  
INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 24–199 (2010); Richard B. Du Boff, Business 
Demand and the Development of the Telegraph in the United States, 1844–1860, 54 BUS. 
HIST. REV. 459 (1980). 
 17. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 4-1001 ser. Dg9. 
 18. Id. at 4-1008 ser. Dg39 (miles of telephone lines); id. ser. Dg34 (telephones); id. at 
4-1013 ser. Dg51 (average daily local conversations). 
 19. Id. at 1-26 ser. Aa2.  Throughout this Article, I have calculated annual averages for 
multiyear time periods using the geometric mean.  For quantities (such as population or 
GDP) as opposed to rates of change (such as the unemployment rate), the geometric mean is 
the same as the compound average growth rate (CAGR). 
 20. Id. at 1-547 ser. Ad22. 
 21. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS:  TABLE 4 (POPULATION: 
1790 TO 1990), available at http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf. 
 22. See id. 
 23. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 1-26 ser. Aa3. 
 24. Id. at 4-338 ser. Db164 (total fossil fuels). 
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during this period was from fossil fuels, almost entirely coal.25  The 
discovery of abundant new coal sources, new mining methods, the 
emergence of railroad networks that could provide cheap and reliable 
transportation, and the development of new, more efficient coal energy 
technologies both reduced the real cost of energy and freed energy-
consuming businesses to locate away from rivers (which provided 
hydropower) and closer to other factors of production (including labor and 
transportation).  Moreover, since hydropower could be subject to 
interruptions caused by limited waterfall, ice, and other weather-related 
conditions, firms demanding a steady, reliable source of power often 
switched to coal energy technologies even when hydropower was 
available.26 
New innovations in production technology, such as the Bessemer process 
of steelmaking, new distillation methods in petroleum refining, and 
Hungarian reduction techniques in flour milling, lowered average 
production costs and created substantial economies of scale.27  At the same 
time, new economies of integration led to vertical growth within the chain 
of manufacturing and distribution, especially in industries where new 
product developments found no existing system for their distribution or 
after-sales support or where new process developments or economies of 
scale overwhelmed the existing distribution system with increased 
production rates.28  Some industries also vertically integrated into raw 
materials to ensure the inputs necessary for large-scale production.29  
Finally, apart from economies from new technologies and vertical 
 
 25. Compare id., with id. ser Db165 (coal). 
 26. See Jeremy Atack, Industrial Structure and the Emergence of the Modern Industrial 
Corporation, 22 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 29, 38 (1985).  For more on the development of 
energy during the period, see ATACK & PASSELL, supra note 1, at 197–201; SAM H. SCHURR 
& BRUCE C. NETSCHERT, ENERGY IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1850–1975 (1960); Jeremy 
Atack, Fred Bateman & Robert A. Margo, Steam Power, Establishment Size, and Labor 
Productivity Growth in Nineteenth Century American Manufacturing, 45 EXPLORATIONS 
ECON. HIST. 185 (2008). 
 27. For an excellent brief survey of the technical developments of the late nineteenth 
century, see John A. James, Structural Change in American Manufacturing, 1850–1890, 
43 J. ECON. HIST. 433 (1983). See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND 
STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962); 
PETER GEORGE, THE EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: STRATEGIC FACTORS IN 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH SINCE 1870 (1982); H.J. HABAKKUK, AMERICAN AND BRITISH 
TECHNOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE SEARCH FOR LABOUR-SAVING INVENTIONS 
(1967); PORTER, supra note 4. 
 28. See CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 302–12, 364.  Most progressive and revisionist 
historians, as well as contemporary observers, have focused on horizontal integration as the 
foundation of big business.  The first historian to emphasize the important role played by 
vertical integration was Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Beginnings 
of “Big Business” in American Industry, 33 BUS. HIST. REV. 1 (1959). See generally ALFRED 
D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE (1990); CHANDLER, supra note 27; CHANDLER, supra 
note 5; MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Herman Daems eds., 1980). 
 29. See NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN 
BUSINESS, 1895–1904, at 38, 144–47 (1985) (examining vertical integration at the Carnegie 
steel plants). 
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integration, significant productivity gains and scale economies resulted 
from a shift in production from artisan shops to factories.30  The larger-
scale factory operations enabled labor efficiencies from learning-by-doing 
by increasing repetition through the subdivision of tasks and increased 
specialization.  This specialization, in turn, later opened opportunities for 
additional efficiencies by mechanizing many tasks.  The larger workforces 
also required monitoring and supervision to ensure performance, which 
resulted in the emergence of salaried managers responsible for improving 
productivity.31 
 
Figure 1:  United States Real GDP (in billions of 2005 dollars)32 
 
The rapid pace of industrialization is reflected in real gross purchases of 
structures and equipment used in manufacturing, which increased (in 2005 
constant dollars) from $2.2 billion to $11.0 billion between 1880 and 1890, 
a factor of five for a compound average growth rate of 17.5 percent over the 
ten-year period.33  Manufacturing production, according to the commonly 
 
 30. See Jeremy Atack, Economies of Scale and Efficiency Gains in the Rise of the 
Factory in America, 1820–1900, in QUANTITY & QUIDDITY:  ESSAYS IN U.S. ECONOMIC 
HISTORY 286 (Peter Kilby ed., 1987); Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Productivity Growth in 
Manufacturing During Early Industrialization: Evidence from the American Northeast, 
1820–1860, in LONG-TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 679 (Stanley L. 
Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 1986). 
 31. See Atack, supra note 30. 
 32.  HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 3-24 to -25 ser. Ca9 (data originally 
reported in 1996 dollars). 
 33. See id. at 4-680 ser. Dd687 (data originally reported in 1958 constant dollars).  
Unfortunately, the data series for this period does not include depreciation or the real net 
value of assets.  Throughout this Article, real dollars refer to 2005 dollars.  When the data 
was originally reported in constant dollars other than 2005 dollars, I converted to 2005 
dollars by multiplying the reported data by the ratio of the GDP deflator for 2005 to the GDP 
deflator for the constant dollar year of the reported data: 
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used Frickey index, grew by over 50 percent and had a compound average 
growth rate of 4.4 percent.34  By 1885, the United States had replaced Great 
Britain as the world’s largest manufacturing nation, accounting for 
29 percent of the world’s industrial production.35 
Agricultural production also soared, aided by the development of the 
western lands and an efficient transportation network, new mechanized 
technologies, and driven by a rapidly expanding population.36  With the 
increasing cultivation of land in the West, the number of farms increased by 
71.6 percent from 2.7 million in 1870 to 4.6 million in 1890,37 while the 
amount of land in farms increased by 52.8 percent from 407.7 million acres 
to 623.2 million acres.38  During this period, agricultural production 
increased 70.8 percent, for a compound average growth rate of 
2.9 percent.39  During the same period, the agricultural labor force increased 
from 6.8 million to 10 million, for a compound average growth rate of 
1.9 percent.40  This suggests that labor productivity grew at about 
1.0 percent per year, which was probably due largely to increased 
mechanization.  The total capital stock used in agriculture increased from 
$218 billion to $379 billion, for a compound average growth rate of 
2.8 percent.41  Land employed in agriculture increased at about the same 
rate, but machinery and equipment grew from $0.6 billion to $1.3 billion, 
for a compound average growth rate of 3.9 percent, again consistent with 
the idea that increased mechanization significantly increased farm labor 
productivity.42 
 
 
Year GDP Deflator
Conversion Ratio 
(to 2005 dollars)
1929 10.593 9.4402
1958 18.157 5.5075
1996 83.154 1.2026
2005 100 1
 
The relevant GDP deflators are reported in U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS tbl.1.1.4 (Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product, with 2005=100), available at 
www.bea.gov/itable/.  For example, to convert $100 in constant 1958 dollars to 2005 dollars, 
multiply $100 by the conversion ratio of 5.5075 to yield $550.75. 
 34. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 4-652 ser. Dd497.  Historical Statistics 
uses the data series developed in EDWIN FRICKEY, PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860–
1914, at 54 (1947). 
 35. W.W. ROSTOW, THE WORLD ECONOMY:  HISTORY & PROSPECT 52 (1978). 
 36. For a review of the post–Civil War agricultural technologies, see RATNER ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 264–65 (1979). 
 37. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 4-43 ser. Da16. 
 38. Id. ser. Da17. 
 39. See id. at 4-204 ser. Da1117. 
 40. See id. at 2-110 ser. Ba817.  Historical Statistics uses the data series developed in 
Stanley Lebergott, Labor Force and Employment, 1800–1960, in OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT, 
AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER 1800, supra note 9, at 117, available at 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1567.pdf. 
 41. See JOHN W. KENDRICK, PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 367 tbl.B-III 
(1961), available at http://www.nber.org/books/kend61-1. 
 42. See id. 
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These changes introduced a period of extraordinary economic growth for 
the nation.  Between 1870 and 1890, real annual GDP more than doubled, 
increasing from $113.0 billion to $277.3 billion (in 2005 dollars), for an 
impressive compound average growth rate of 4.5 percent.43  Even with a 
rapidly growing population, real annual per capita GDP during the same 
period increased from $2,856 to $4,397, for an average annual growth rate 
of 2.2 percent.44  Real total net capital stock of capital consumption, 
including capital for industry, agriculture, and housing, grew from 
$255 billion to $642 billion, for a compound average growth rate of 
4.7 percent.45  On a per laborer basis, net capital stock grew from $26,600 to 
$37,900, for a compound average growth rate of 1.8 percent.46  Over the 
period, overall output per unit of labor input increased by 43.4 percent, for a 
compound average growth rate of 1.8 percent, while output per unit of 
capital increased by 26.3 percent, for a compound average growth rate of 
1.2 percent.47 
 
Table 1:  Economic Indicators for 1870–1890 
 
II.  THE “TRUST” MOVEMENT 
But these were also turbulent economic times.  Notwithstanding the 
enormous increases in production and productivity, the period from 1870 to 
1890 was marked by deep recessions and declining prices.  The Warren-
Pearson wholesale price index for all commodities fell from 135 to 82, for a 
compound average rate of decline of 2.5 percent.48  Certainly much of this 
 
 43. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 3-24 to -25 ser. Ca9 (data originally 
reported in 1996 dollars). 
 44. See id. at ser. Ca11 (data originally reported in 1996 dollars). 
 45. SIMON KUZNETS, CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY:  ITS FORMATION AND 
FINANCING 64 tbl.3 (1961) (data originally reported in 1929 constant dollars). 
 46. Id. 
 47. KENDRICK, supra note 41, at 332 tbl.A-XXI. 
 48. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 3-182 to -183 ser. Cc113. 
 
Indicator 
CAGR 
1870–1890 
Real GDP 4.5% 
Real GDP per capita 2.2% 
Population 2.5% 
Manufacturing output 5.2% 
Agricultural output 2.9% 
Real net capital stock 4.7% 
Real net capital stock per laborer 1.8% 
Output per unit of labor 1.8% 
Output per unit of capital 1.2% 
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price decline was due to the tight monetary policy that the United States 
followed, at least until 1879, as part of the return to the gold standard from 
the “greenback” standard after the Civil War.49  In the Long Depression 
from 1873 to 1879, this caused an asset price deflation even as unit 
production was increasing.  Between 1873 and 1878, nominal GDP 
declined 2.5 percent while real GDP increased 17.9 percent.50  After 1879, 
when specie payments resumed, the price deflator exhibited a much slower, 
but still downward, trend until around 1896. 
 
Figure 2:  GDP Price Deflator (2005 = 100)51 
 
But at least some of the price decline during the period was due to 
rapidly expanding aggregate output, which exceeded the rate of population 
and export growth, coupled with broadening geographic markets that 
brought more firms into competition with one another.  David A. Wells, a 
prominent popular economist at the time, believed that the primary cause of 
declining prices was overproduction and underemployment, both caused by 
technological advances.52  Moreover, where an increasingly large 
investment was necessary to build minimum efficient scale factories, it was 
in the interest of profit-maximizing firms to continue to produce as long as 
price exceeded variable costs, even if the firm could not cover its fixed 
 
 49. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1960, at 15–88 (1963). 
 50. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 3-24 ser. Ca13 (price deflator with 
1996 =100); id. ser. Ca10 (nominal GDP); id. ser. Ca9 (real GDP). 
 51. Id. ser. Ca13 (data originally reported with 1996 = 100). 
 52. See David A. Wells, The Economic Disturbances Since 1873 (pts. 1–5), 31 POPULAR 
SCI. MONTHLY 289, 433, 577, 768 (1887), 32 POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY 1 (1887).  Other 
contemporary analyses, while acknowledging the popular strength of Well’s argument, more 
properly identified the problem. See, e.g., MORETON FREWEN, THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 165–94 
(1888) (responding to Well’s argument). 
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costs.53  These factors gave rise to what became popularly known as 
“ruinous,” “destructive,” or “excessive” competition, that is, competition 
that drives prices below a level that permits the producer to make a fair 
return on its productive efforts, assuming that it can stay in business at all.54 
The sugar industry provides a vivid illustration of the problem.  In 1867, 
there were about fifty-two firms operating sixty refineries in the United 
States and collectively producing about 421,000 short tons of refined 
sugar.55  Over the next twenty years, the introduction of new batch 
processing technology reduced the length of the refining process from two 
weeks to twenty-four hours or less, depending on the type of sugar being 
refined.56  By 1890, total production increased by almost a factor of four to 
1,617,000 short tons, far in excess of population and export growth.57  As 
production increased, supply soon significantly outstripped demand at 
existing prices, competition among the sugar refineries became heated, and 
prices rapidly declined.  Profit margins reportedly dropped by almost 80 
percent from $0.03 per pound in 1876 to $0.00685 in 1887.58  Despite 
production tripling, some thirty-six refineries went out of business.59  The 
companies that survived had invested in large-scale production 
technologies, with the largest producing about 8,000 barrels a day, while 
the refineries that failed produced only about 75 to 400 barrels daily.  
Moreover, as the turn of the decade approached, it was obvious that some of 
the remaining refineries would not survive.  Reserving for the moment 
whether it was in the public interest to allow the remaining refineries to 
consolidate and coordinate which plants would continue to operate, the 
private incentive to achieve some central coordination was compelling.60 
 
 53. See PORTER, supra note 4, at 10–11; see also Chandler, supra note 3, at 28 (noting 
the expense of shutting down a factory and observing that from the mid-1870s to the mid-
1890s the supply of goods outstripped the demand and prices fell sharply).  This is the well-
known “empty core” problem. See LESTER G. TELSER, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE CORE 
41–87 (1978). See generally Abagail McWilliams & Kristen Keith, The Genesis of the 
Trusts:  Rationalization in Empty Core Markets, 12 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 245 (1994). 
 54. Later, in some contexts “destructive” competition came to mean primary or 
secondary line price discrimination designed to competitively disadvantage rivals if not drive 
them out of business.  This is the sense in which the Industrial Commission used the term at 
the turn of the century. See, e.g., 19 U.S. INDUS. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 660–62 (1902) (supplemental statement of Thomas W. Phillips). 
 55. PAUL L. VOGT, THE SUGAR REFINING INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 9–11 (1908) 
(number of refineries); see also HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 4-627 ser. Dd369 
(refined sugar production). 
 56. VOGT, supra note 55, at 17. 
 57. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 4-627 ser. Dd369. 
 58. VOGT, supra note 55, at 18. 
 59.  Id. 
 60. For more on the sugar industry in the late nineteenth century, see generally ALFRED 
S. EICHNER, THE EMERGENCE OF OLIGOPOLY:  SUGAR REFINING AS A CASE STUDY (1978); 
VOGT, supra note 55; David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Testing Static Oligopoly 
Models:  Conduct and Cost in the Sugar Industry, 1890–1914, 29 RAND J. ECON. 355, 368 
(1998); John E. Searles, American Sugar, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 
257 (Chauncey M. Depew ed., 1895); Richard Zerbe, The American Sugar Refinery 
Company, 1887–1914:  The Story of a Monopoly, 12 J.L. & ECON. 339 (1969). 
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Table 2:  Changing Conditions in the Sugar Industry 
 
 
Year 
Number 
of Refineries 
Industry Output 
(000 short tons) 
Average Output 
per Plant 
1860 41 394 9.6 
1870 59 598 10.1 
1880 49 994 20.3 
1887 24 1507 62.8 
 
There was considerable sympathy at the time regarding the problem of 
excessive competition, and many saw merit in allowing businesses to 
organize to prevent excessive competition.61  Classical economic thinking, 
then prevalent, held that in normal markets the law of supply and demand 
would set a natural price at a reasonable and remunerative level, while 
excessive competition drives the price below remunerative levels.  Under 
this view, although excessive competition benefits customers temporarily 
through lower prices, competitors who cannot survive exit the market, and 
when enough competitors have left, the remaining firms raise prices above 
remunerative levels until new entry appears and the cycle repeats itself.62 
But even apart from declining prices and profits, competing firms had yet 
another reason to consolidate:  the prospect of supracompetitive profits.  
Once scale economies had been exhausted and the markets reequilibrated 
with a smaller number of firms (albeit larger ones), the ability to control 
market supply can result in supracompetitive profits.  Where other firms are 
present in the marketplace, the ability to control supply is limited by the 
competitive interactions of the firms.  If one firm attempts to decrease 
production in an effort to reduce supply, other firms in the market have an 
incentive to take up some or all of the slack.  As a result, it is seldom in the 
interest of one firm in a defragmented, multi-firm market to reduce supply 
below its competitive level.  But, at least in principle, if firms supplying a 
sufficient amount of the market supply cooperate in reducing production, 
they can decide upon a joint profit-maximizing strategy that would 
significantly increase each of their profits above the competitive level.  
Likewise, while firms in some industries may face incentives to vertically 
integrate into raw materials or distribution channels because of lower costs 
through economies of integration, a firm that obtains control over essential 
raw materials or distribution channels may be able to create barriers to entry 
 
 61. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GENERAL LAWS RELATIVE TO COMBINATIONS 
COMMONLY KNOWN AS TRUSTS, S. 112-64, at 5 (N.Y. 1889) [hereinafter NEW YORK 1889 
REPORT] (“Such contests [from excessive competition] often result in wounds which it takes 
long years to heal, and from them the public not only receive no real benefit, but positive 
injury rather, for sooner or later the public are expected to make good the losses which such 
ruinous policies entail.”). 
 62. See id. at 6. 
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to new competition and enable the firm to earn supracompetitive profits 
even in the absence of economies of integration.63 
III.  FORMS OF COMBINATION AND PRE-ANTITRUST REGULATION 
The increasing competition among firms and the decline in nominal 
prices and the threat to producers’ profits, if not survival—so-called 
excessive competition—created strong incentives in many industries to 
coordinate and centralize operations in order to reduce capacity, control 
overproduction, and reduce competitive pricing pressure.  A New York 
State Senate committee studying trusts at the time reported that 
“[c]ombination rarely exists except as the result of excessive 
competition.”64  Similarly, although outside of our period of study, at the 
turn of the century, the U.S. Industrial Commission cited excessive 
competition as the most important factor in prompting mergers and 
acquisitions among competitors in the merger wave beginning in 1895.65  
But given these incentives to coordinate, there remained the question of the 
means of coordination. 
Prior to 1879, there were three vehicles for competitors wishing to 
coordinate their operations:  simple combinations, pools, and corporations.  
As discussed below, simple agreements and pools suffered from serious 
incentive compatibility problems that could not be overcome by contract, 
since almost all U.S. courts refused to enforce a combination’s underlying 
agreements.  Housing the combination in a corporation would have solved 
the enforceability problem by eliminating the independence of the member 
firms and substituting a command-and-control management structure.  But 
at the time, corporations were strictly limited by state law in their size, 
scope of operations, and ability to hold stock in other corporations, and 
hence were unsuitable for combinations of any size and geographic scope.  
In 1879, the Standard Oil combination created the trust proper, which 
enabled the combination to exercise command and control over its 
operations much like a corporate holding company but without being 
hindered by the constraints imposed on corporations by state corporation 
laws.  Within the next decade, several major, and an unknown number of 
more minor, combinations had emulated Standard Oil and adopted a trust 
structure.  But the trust structure was soon attacked by several states that 
sought to revoke the charters of corporations organized under their laws for 
participating in a trust.  Just at the same time, however, New Jersey began 
to significantly liberalize its corporation laws, which enabled large 
 
 63. Economies of scale were probably not a reason to combine, at least in “loose” 
combinations where member firms remained separate albeit collaborating entities.  For the 
most part, economies of scale occur at the plant or factory level. SCHMITZ, supra note 1, at 
57.  Since loose combinations did not integrate the facilities of their members, there probably 
were little or no economies of scale to be gained.  
 64. NEW YORK 1889 REPORT, supra note 61, at 6. 
 65. See 19 U.S. INDUS. COMM’N, supra note 54, at 604.  For a modern analysis drawing 
the same conclusion, see LAMOREAUX, supra note 29, at 87. 
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combinations to adopt a corporate form.  Collectively, these four vehicles 
became known as “trusts,” and they were the vehicles at which the coming 
antitrust legislation was aimed. 
A.  Simple Combinations 
The simplest form of combination is an agreement among firms that 
remain otherwise legally independent of one another.  These agreements 
tend to have simple terms, such as not selling below a certain price, 
producing above a certain level, or allocating customers or sales territories 
to particular participating firms.  To allow the agreement to be more 
flexible and enable the participating firms to respond to changing market 
conditions, sometimes the contracting members would form an 
unincorporated association and use its governance mechanism to centrally 
fix prices and perhaps allocate sales quantities or customers among the 
members.66  The idea behind these simple combinations is that if the 
contracting members adhere to the agreement, they will make more profits 
than they would in the absence of the agreement.  Each member, however, 
remains individually responsible for operating its own business and the 
profits it earns are the profits generated by that business (that is, it does not 
share in the profits of other combination members).  We recognize these 
arrangements today as garden-variety horizontal cartels. 
A significant problem that contractual combinations face is cheating on 
the combination’s rules.  Each participating firm has an incentive to breach 
its agreement by secretly shaving prices, increasing production above the 
agreement’s allocation limits, or making sales to customers that have been 
allocated to other members.  After all, if everyone else in the combination 
follows the rules, a firm that breaches the agreement can undercut its 
competitors and sell more output at less than the combination’s price (but 
still at higher prices than would exist with unregulated competition) and 
make much higher profits than it could if it followed the rules.  Since all 
participants face similar incentives, this can make the combination very 
unstable.67 
This incentive incompatibility is the well-known prisoner’s dilemma 
problem for cartels.68  The obvious solution to the cheating problem is to 
 
 66. The Articles of Association of the Manufacturers of Gunpowder, adopted on April 
23, 1872, provides an example. See INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND TRUSTS 2 (William S. 
Stevens ed., 1913) (reprinting articles of association).  A variation is where one of the firms, 
rather than an association, attempts to corner a market by entering into agreements with its 
competitors, whereby the competitors would agree over the term of the contract to supply the 
cornering firm with a certain quantity at a fixed (and presumably supracompetitive) price 
and not to sell to any other person. See, e.g., Santa Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. 
Hayes, 18 P. 391, 391–92 (Cal. 1888). 
 67. For more on cheating as the central problem in cartels, see ROBERT C. MARSHALL & 
LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION:  CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS 105–06 
(2012). 
 68. In addition to incentive incompatibility in following the rules, simple combinations 
also face a coordination problem:  they have to reach agreement on the particular cartel rules 
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make the combination rules somehow enforceable.  A common method 
would be for the combination to create a contract with remedies for 
breach.69  For example, the contract could provide that each participating 
firm deposit a bond that the firm would forfeit to the other members if it 
breached the rules70 or for the recovery of liquated damages by compliant 
members from a member that breaches the contractually specified rules.71  
But to the extent that the enforcement mechanism was an action in court—
say, for recovery on a bond, liquated damages, actual damages, or even 
specific performance—most courts of the day would not intervene and grant 
relief.  With relatively rare exceptions, U.S. courts held that combination 
agreements that were designed to raise prices or reduce output were 
contrary to public policy and hence unenforceable as a matter of contract 
law. 
This rule had its origin in the early English common law of contracts in 
restraint of trade.  The early courts originally saw noncompetition 
covenants in connection with a master-apprentice relationship and in 
contracts for the sale of a business at a time when all business was 
essentially local.  Employers, then as now, often develop special skills in 
the business as well as a detailed knowledge and close rapport with their 
customers.  These employers did not wish for their employees, after 
learning the business and the customers, to go into competition against 
them when the employees left their employment.  To guard against this, 
employers often required their employees to agree not to compete against 
them for some number of years after the employee left their service.  
Similarly, if a seller of a business opened a nearby competing 
establishment, the seller could attract his old customers away from the 
buyer and deprive the buyer of the benefit of his bargain.  To deal with this 
problem of retained goodwill, buyers included covenants in their purchase 
agreements that prevented the seller from competing with his old business 
at least for a certain period of time.  These noncompetition covenants 
became known as ancillary restraints, since they were connected to the 
creation of an employment relationship or to the sale of a business. 
Courts initially were hostile to ancillary noncompetition covenants.  
Dyer’s Case,72 decided when the Black Death made labor scarce, is the first 
 
they propose to follow.  Even if the rules are followed, since different rules can have 
different profit consequences for the members individually, reaching agreement on the rules 
can be a major hurdle in cartel formation.  For more on problems of cartel formation, see, for 
example, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 20–26 (2006). See 
generally George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964). 
 69. Contracts are not the only cartel enforcement mechanism.  Another possibility is 
preagreed reaction strategies by the conforming cartel members to punish members that 
breach the cartel rules. See, e.g., Robert H. Porter, Optimal Cartel Trigger Price Strategies, 
29 J. ECON. THEORY 313 (1983). 
 70. See, e.g., Palmer v. Stebbins, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 188, 188 (1825); Diamond Match 
Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 420 (N.Y. 1887); De Witt Wire-Cloth Co. v. N.J. Wire-Cloth 
Co., 14 N.Y.S. 277, 278 (C.P. 1891). 
 71. See, e.g., Cent. Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 668 (1880). 
 72. Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, Pasch, pl. 26 (1414) (Eng.). 
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reported case on contracts in restraint of trade.  Although the report of the 
case is meager, it appears that the court refused to enforce a debt on a bond 
when the defendant allegedly broke his agreement not to practice the trade 
of dyeing in his hometown for half a year.73  As late as 1602, English courts 
held that it was against the law to prohibit any lawful trade at any time or at 
any place.74  Very likely, this hostility had its origins in the English law of 
apprenticeship.  No one without an exemption could practice a regular trade 
or craft without serving a long apprenticeship and obtaining membership in 
the appropriate guild or company.  At a time when guilds were local in their 
jurisdiction and very reluctant to admit strangers to their membership, a 
covenant not to compete, even when confined to a limited geographic area, 
was tantamount to a ban on employment within the profession.  This not 
only deprived the community of the services of a skilled laborer but also 
threatened the community with an additional welfare burden. 
As the English economy became more developed, the opportunities for 
employment and trade expanded and competition increased, causing the 
reasons for the original strict rule against contracts in restraint of trade to 
gradually disappear.75  By the beginning of the eighteenth century, some 
courts were enforcing these ancillary restraints when they were supported 
by adequate consideration and were reasonable under the circumstances to 
balance the interests of the contracting parties and the community.  The first 
innovation on the old rule came in the 1614 case of Rogers v. Parrey.76  The 
plaintiff had leased a house in London to the defendant for a term of 
twenty-one years, for which the defendant paid ten pounds and promised 
not to allow the adjoining shop to be used for the trade of a joiner.77  After 
 
 73. See id. 
 74. See Colgate v. Bacheler, (1602) 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (K.B.) 1097 (voiding a bond 
given by a haberdasher to abstain in the County of Kent on the cities of Canterbury and 
Rochester from the use of his trade for four years or pay a bond of twenty).  For other cases 
between 1414 and 1601, see, for example, Anonymous, (1587) 72 Eng. Rep. 555 (K.B.) 555 
(voiding a bond on a noncompetition covenant by one blacksmith to another in Southmins 
not to compete in the town), and Anonymous, (1578) 72 Eng. Rep. 476 (K.B.) 477 (holding 
unenforceable a covenant by an apprentice not to exercise his craft in Nottingham for four 
years, a period longer than the law of apprenticeship recognized).  Both cases cite Dyer’s 
Case as the supporting authority. See Anonymous, 72 Eng. Rep. at 476; Anonymous, 72 Eng. 
Rep. at 555. 
 75. This common law evolutionary process was recognized, at least retrospectively, in 
the cases. See, e.g., Nat’l Benefit Co. v. Union Hosp. Co., 47 N.W. 806, 807 (Minn. 1891); 
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] 1 A.C. 535 (H.L.) 547; 
8 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 56 (1925) (observing that “the law 
as to contracts in restraint of trade has, more than any other class of contracts, been moulded 
by changing ideas of public policy”). 
 76. (1613) 80 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B.).  The case is also reported at (1613) 79 Eng. Rep. 
278 (K.B.).  Rogers was also the earliest recorded action of assumpsit on a contact in 
restraint of trade. See ALFRED W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF 
CONTRACT:  THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 522 (1975). 
 77. Rogers, 80 Eng. Rep. at 1012–13. 
 2296 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
the defendant broke his covenant, the plaintiff sued on assumpsit.78  Edward 
Coke, then chief justice of the Court of King’s Bench, held that the 
restrictive covenant was valid, since the restrictions were reasonable in light 
of the circumstances and limited “for a time certain, and in a place 
certain.”79 
The most detailed and influential analysis of the relaxed rule appeared 
almost a century later in the celebrated 1711 case of Mitchel v. Reynolds.80  
Mitchel leased a bakehouse from Reynolds in a parish of London for five 
years, and Reynolds agreed that if he worked anywhere in that parish as a 
baker during that time he would pay the plaintiff £50 and posted a bond to 
secure his promise.81  When Mitchel sued Reynolds to collect on the bond 
for breach of his covenant, Reynolds, in defense, pleaded that, since he had 
served his apprenticeship as a baker and had been admitted to the guild, no 
private person could lawfully prevent him from working at that trade and 
that he should not be required to pay the £50.82  Chief Justice Parker 
disagreed and ordered that the debt on the bond should be paid.83  To 
Parker, a covenant not to compete was reasonable and therefore enforceable 
as a matter of contract law, since it restricted the business opportunities of 
the covenantor no more than necessary to achieve the legitimate business 
objective of ensuring that Mitchel obtained the benefit of his bargain.84  On 
the other hand, Parker opined, if the restraint prohibited Reynolds from 
competing throughout England, the restraint would have been unlawful 
since it reached beyond areas in which Mitchel had a legitimate need for 
protection.85 
Courts quickly construed Mitchell to apply different rules depending on 
whether the challenged restraint was general or partial.  General restraints 
of trade, that is, restraints that prohibited the covenantor from competing 
anywhere in the jurisdiction at any time, were always void and 
unenforceable since they both deprived the public of the restricted party’s 
industry as well as prevented him from pursuing his occupation and 
supporting himself and his family.86  Partial restraints of trade, which were 
limited in time and place and so provided the covenantor some opportunity 
to work, were presumptively illegal, but the presumption could be rebutted 
where the party seeking to enforce the restriction (or collect damages for a 
 
 78. Id.  Assumpsit is a form of action for the recovery of damages for the 
nonperformance of a simple contract (that is, a contract not under seal or of record). See 
1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A TREATISE ON PLEADING 111 (5th ed. 1831). 
 79. Id. at 1013. 
 80. (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B.). 
 81. Id. at 347. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 348. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Or. Steam. Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68 (1873); 
Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51, 53–54 (1837) (also noting that general restraints 
can “prevent competition and enhance prices” and “expose the public to all the evils of 
monopoly”); Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 520, 532 (1853). 
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breach) could demonstrate that the restraint was ancillary to a legitimate 
business purpose and was reasonable in light of its scope, the business 
purpose it furthered, and the interest of the public.  The seminal statement 
of the common law reasonableness test was provided by Chief Judge Tindal 
for the Court of Common Pleas in Horner v. Graves87: 
[W]e do not see how a better test can be applied to the question whether 
reasonable or not, than by considering whether the restraint is such only 
as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favour of 
whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the 
public.  Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the 
party, can be of no benefit to either, it can only be oppressive; and if 
oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable.  Whatever is 
injurious to the interests of the public is void, on the grounds of public 
policy.88 
Many American courts, as well as English courts, adopted the Horner 
formulation.89  Over time—as markets continued to broaden, businesses 
grew bigger, and labor mobility generally improved—some (but not all) 
courts moved away from the strict distinction between general and partial 
restraints and relied more on the reasonableness test to determine the 
enforceability of ancillary restraints.90  Courts first began to apply a 
 
 87. (1831) 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P.). 
 88. Id. at 287. 
 89. For American cases following the Horner formulation, see, for example, Or. Steam 
Navigation, 87 U.S. at 67 & n.†; Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 349–50 (1875); 
Mandeville v. Harman, 7 A. 37, 39 (N.J. Ch. 1886); Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N.J. Eq. 537, 
547 (1868); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421 (N.Y. 1887); Grasselli v. 
Lowden, 11 Ohio St. 349, 357 (1860); Lange, 2 Ohio St. at 528–29; Morris Run Coal Co. v. 
Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 185 (1871); French v. Parker, 14 A. 870, 871 (R.I. 1888). 
 90. In Diamond Match, a leading case at the time, the New York Court of Appeals 
explored the decline of the distinction between general and partial restraints in detail. 
Diamond Match, 13 N.E. at 419.  On the facts, Diamond Match sued William Roeber for 
liquated damages and an injunction for violating a noncompetition covenant to which Roeber 
had agreed when he sold his New York match manufacturing business. Id. at 419–20.  The 
covenant restricted Roeber from engaging directly or indirectly in the sale of friction 
matches for a period of ninety-nine years anywhere in the United States except in Nevada 
and Montana. Id. at 419.  Diamond Match sought to enforce the covenant when Roeber 
became the superintendent of a rival match manufacturing company in New Jersey. Id. at 
420.  The court found the restraint on Roeber to be reasonable and enforceable. Id. at 423.  
Although the restraint was essentially general in nature (although technically partial because 
of the exclusions), the purchaser sold to dealers in multiple states using traveling salesmen 
and the restraint was designed to ensure the purchaser of the full benefit of its bargain. Id. at 
420.  The court also found that the restraint only bound the individual seller and did not 
exclude third parties from entering the business, and that there was “little danger that the 
public will suffer harm from lack of persons to engage in a profitable industry.” Id. at 422.  
For other cases rejecting the rule that general restraints are always unenforceable and relying 
solely on the reasonableness test, see, for example, W. Wooden-Ware Ass’n v. Starkey, 
47 N.W. 604 (Mich. 1890) (finding restraint overly broad and hence unreasonable and 
unenforceable); Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365–66 (N.Y. 1888); Herreshoff v. 
Boutineau, 19 A. 712, 713 (R.I. 1890) (same). 
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reasonableness test to restraints that were unlimited in duration.91  Courts 
were more reluctant to apply a reasonableness test to “unlimited” territorial 
restraints.92  Indeed, some jurisdictions defined general restraints to include 
those that covered the entire territory of the jurisdiction (such as a state) 
even when they permitted the restricted party to operate outside of the 
jurisdiction.93  Eventually, however, even those restraints became subject to 
the reasonableness test94 and the distinction between general and partial 
restraints began to diminish in favor of a pure reasonableness test.95  
Over time, in applying the reasonableness test, courts also began to defer 
increasingly to the contracting parties.  The point of departure in a 
reasonableness analysis is whether the restriction is overly broad in the 
sense that it goes beyond the legitimate protectable interests of the 
restriction’s beneficiary.  Courts increasingly held that the parties, rather 
than the courts, were in the best position in the give and take of their 
bargaining to draw the right balance between these opposing interests.96  
 
 91. See, e.g., Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175, 178 (1879); Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. 
344, 346 (Ind. 1845); Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561, 567 (1870); Webster v. Buss, 
61 N.H. 40, 40 (1881); French, 14 A. at 871. 
 92. See, e.g., Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66, 68 (1884); Bishop v. Palmer, 16 N.E. 
299, 303–04 (Mass. 1888). 
 93. See, e.g., More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251 (1870); Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal. 342, 359 
(1868); Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 370, 374–75 (1866); State v. Neb. 
Distilling Co., 46 N.W. 155, 160 (Neb. 1890); Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N.Y. 241, 244–45 
(1851) (dictum); Lange, 2 Ohio St. at 530.  The idea was that a noncompetition covenant 
deprived a state’s citizens of the restricted party’s productive endeavors as would a covenant 
that covered the entire county which drove the restricted party to another state. Taylor, 
95 Mass. at 374–75. 
 94. See, e.g., Or. Steam Navigation, 87 U.S. at 64 (upholding noncompetition restraint 
that covered California and other areas); Morse Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Morse, 103 
Mass. 73 (1869) (upholding unlimited territorial restriction); Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490 
(1875) (upholding a noncompetition covenant in connection with the sale of a printing 
business that covered the entire state); Bailey v. Collins, 59 N.H. 459 (1879); Diamond 
Match, 13 N.E. at 421–23 (upholding a covenant in connection with the sale of a New York 
match factory not to compete in the sale of friction matches anywhere within the United 
States except Nevada and Montana); Herreshoff, 19 A. at 713 (holding noncompetition 
covenant in connection with employment not void simply because it covered the entire 
state).  Some courts were also willing to view the territorial restriction as divisible, so if a 
contract named a smaller area that was reasonable and a larger area that was overly broad 
(e.g., “the City of Jacksonville, or anywhere in the United States”), the court would enforce 
the restriction as to the smaller area but not the larger one. See, e.g., Wiley, 97 Ind. at 69 
(1884) (noting rule); Peltz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171, 173 (1876) (reducing covered territory 
from “any other place” to St. Louis); Lange, 2 Ohio St. at 531 (reducing covered territory 
from the United States to one county). 
 95. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) (“The question is 
whether, under the particular circumstances of the case and the nature of the particular 
contract involved in it, the contract is or is not unreasonable.”); W. Wooden-Ware Ass’n, 
47 N.W. at 604; Herreshoff, 19 A. at 713; Leslie, 18 N.E. at 365–66; Diamond Match, 
13 N.E. at 421.  In England, the House of Lords eliminated the distinction in 1894. 
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] 1 A.C. 535. 
 96. See, e.g., Beal, 31 Mich. at 523 (Christiancy, J.) (“[W]here such a contract is the 
result of fair bargaining, the reasonable presumption is, that each party, in view of all the 
circumstances which were within his own intimate knowledge, was able to see how the 
bargain was to result to his advantage, and that the party resigning the business did not do so 
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The idea was that the beneficiary would have to pay the restricted party 
more consideration as the restriction became broader, and that a beneficiary 
therefore would not seek a restrictive covenant that was broader than his 
legitimate interest.97  So by the 1890s, the case results were heavily 
weighted toward enforcing ancillary restraints negotiated by the parties, at 
least in the typical situation of the sale of a business. 
But it is important to keep in mind that the litigants in these cases were 
almost always the contracting parties, not the state or injured third parties.  
An action on the condition of a bond, assumpsit, or specific performance 
could only be brought by a party with an enforceable contractual right.  The 
existence of an enforceable obligation necessitated a valid contract, which 
in turn required mutuality of consideration.  The early courts did not 
recognize executory obligations on the part of the covenantee to be legally 
sufficient consideration.  Consequently, the purchase of a business and the 
employment for pay were two of the few types of nonexecutory 
consideration that could support the covenantee’s side of the bargain for a 
noncompetitive covenant from the other party.98  In these cases, a decision 
not to enforce a restrictive covenant would have relieved the restricted party 
from an obligation that it had freely accepted at the time the contract was 
entered or would otherwise work a significant injustice to an essentially 
innocent party.99 
Enforcing a noncompetition covenant in connection with the sale of a 
business or an employment contract also was unlikely to threaten the public 
interest by reducing competition, raising prices, or reducing market output.  
The buyer replaced the seller in the operation of the business, and the 
employer continued to work in the town training apprentices, with the 
graduating apprentices moving elsewhere to work.  In these cases, although 
the effect on the public interest remained part of the reasonableness test, 
there was no reason for courts to take competitive effects (as we understand 
them today) into the analysis.  There was the rare case where an agreement 
could adversely affect competition, but in these cases the courts could rely 
on the public interest leg of the test to find the contract unenforceable.  For 
example, a company could buy up all of its competitors, bind each one of 
them to a noncompetition covenant, and (at least temporarily) become the 
only seller in the marketplace allowing it to raise prices.  This was the 
situation in Richardson v. Buhl,100 where the Michigan Supreme Court 
refused to enforce a noncompetition covenant in connection with the sale of 
a business, since the purchase and the covenant were part of a broader 
 
without being fully satisfied that he was receiving full equivalent, which would be more 
advantageous to him than the property and the business sold.”). 
 97. See id. at 522–23. 
 98. Occasionally, a case would arise when the covenantee would simply pay the 
restricted party not to compete. See, e.g., Leslie, 18 N.E. at 364 (where a new competitor 
allegedly engaged in predatory conduct in order to coerce a payment in return for exiting 
business from the incumbent steamship company). 
 99. See, e.g., Manchester & L.R.R. v. Concord R.R., 20 A. 383 (N.H. 1890). 
 100. 43 N.W. 1102 (Mich. 1889). 
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scheme to monopolize the U.S. market for matches by purchasing the assets 
of most match manufacturing companies in the country.101  Courts also 
opposed ancillary restraints that indirectly imposed restrictions on third 
parties.102  As a general rule, courts held that public policy favored 
competition because competition tended to provide consumers with the 
lowest possible prices, and opposed monopolies, which tended to raise 
prices.103 
Courts began to see more contracts that could substantially affect 
competition once the courts accepted reciprocal executory commitments as 
valid consideration for the purposes of mutuality in the eighteenth century.  
This created the possibility of contracts consisting of reciprocal 
noncompetition covenants:  the commitment of A not to compete with B 
could be the requisite consideration for B’s commitment not to compete 
with A and vice versa.  These reciprocal noncompetition commitments, 
which did not promote capital mobility or labor training, made the 
elimination of competition the primary, if not only, purpose of the contract 
between the parties.  To distinguish them from restraints ancillary to 
business sales or employment relationships, some courts called 
arrangements involving these reciprocal, noncompetition covenants 
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, although many courts 
drew no distinction and continued to call these restraints simply contracts in 
restraint of trade.  However denominated, the distinguishing factor was that 
these restraints were nonancilliary in the sense that they did not promote 
the sale of a business, the hiring of employees, or any other primary 
business purpose; rather, their primary purpose was to eliminate 
competition among the convenantors.   
When confronted with nonancilliary reciprocal noncompetition covenants 
that threatened to raise prices and reduce output, courts generally refused to 
enforce them.  By 1890, most courts in the United States agreed that, when 
the challenged restraints encompassed all or materially all of the 
competitors in a trading area and completely determined the members’ 
manner of trade, the restraints were void as contrary to public policy and 
hence unenforceable.  Courts often reached this result after finding that the 
purpose of the combination was to artificially enhance prices, often through 
limiting supply either by reducing their own production or sales or by 
 
 101. Id. at 1110. 
 102. See, e.g., Crawford & Murray v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190 (1868) (declaring unlawful a 
covenant in a contract for the lease of coal lands that obligated the lessee to require his 
employees to purchase all of their supplies at the lessor’s store). 
 103. See, e.g., Anderson v. Jett, 12 S.W. 670, 672 (Ky. 1889) (“That public policy that 
encourages fair dealing, honest thrift, and enterprise among all the citizens of the 
commonwealth, and is opposed to monopolies and combinations, because unfriendly to such 
thrift and enterprise, declares all combinations whose object is to destroy or impede free 
competition between the several lines of business engaged in utterly void.”); Cent. Ohio Salt 
Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 672 (1880) (“Public policy, unquestionably, favors 
competition in trade, to the end that its commodities may be afforded to the consumer as 
cheaply as possible, and is opposed to monopolies, which tend to advance market prices, to 
the injury of the general public.”). 
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contracting with third parties not to sell into the area.104  Then, as today, 
courts were reluctant to engage explicitly in a balancing analysis under the 
reasonableness test for a restraint of trade, so they almost always decided 
cases at the corners:  they found these types of restraints unenforceable 
because they were general restraints of trade105 or because the restraint was 
not ancillary to any legitimate business purpose and deprived the public of 
the benefits of competition.106  On the other hand, courts typically upheld 
restraints that were partial, involved less than all of the sellers in the market, 
had a legitimate business purpose, and did not restrict third parties from 
competing with the contracting parties.107 
In addition to analyzing noncompetition agreements among combinations 
under a reasonableness test for restraints of trade, many courts also 
characterized the ability of a combination to raise prices or restrict market 
 
 104. See, e.g., Anderson, 12 S.W. at 670 (finding void a combination to eliminate all 
competition and pool profits between two rival steamboat companies on the Kentucky river); 
India Bagging Ass’n v. B. Kock & Co., 14 La. Ann. 168 (1859) (summarily finding 
unenforceable an agreement whereby eight firms agreed for a period of three months not to 
sell their holdings of India bagging without the consent of the majority); Pittsburgh Carbon 
Co. v. McMillin, 23 N.E. 530 (N.Y. 1890) (combination of nine carbon companies that 
consolidated their management and control of their respective businesses in a trustee); Arnot 
v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1876) (holding that a contract providing that 
P&E would purchase up to a fixed amount of coal per month from its competitor and that the 
competitor would not sell coal into the Elmira market was in furtherance of a corner by P&E 
designed to create artificially high prices in the Elmira market and hence illegal); Stanton v. 
Allen, 5 Denio 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) (finding void for public policy a pooling agreement 
among all transportation lines on the Erie and Oswego canals). 
 105. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Am. Union Tel. Co., 65 Ga. 161, 163 (1880) (“Such 
contracts are not favored by the law; they are against the public policy, because they tend to 
create monopolies, and are in general restraint of trade.”); Cent. Ohio Salt, 25 Ohio St. at 
672–73 (refusing to enforce a voluntary association agreement among salt manufacturers in a 
large trading area where the association could regulate member production, and all produced 
salt, when packed in barrels, became the property of the association to be sold only at retail 
and at fixed prices); see also Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 525 (Ct. App. 
1880) (characterizing restraints held void and unenforceable in Craft, Morris Coal, Arnot, 
and Stanton as “restraints in the general sense”). 
 106. See, e.g., Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346 (1875) (finding illegal an agreement to 
form a secret partnership of all grain dealers in the town and surrounding area to pool profits 
in the sale of grain in Rochelle, Illinois); Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 
173 (1871) (finding illegal an association agreement among five coal companies to allocate 
coal regions that they controlled and to sell coal only in amounts and at prices set by the 
association). 
 107. See, e.g., People’s Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Chi. Gaslight & Coke Co., 20 Ill. App. 
473 (1886) (noting actual competition from other sellers and enforcing mutual 
noncompetition covenants between two gas companies), rev’d on other grounds, 13 N.E. 
169 (1887) (finding restraints, although partial, prejudicial to the public interest and hence 
unenforceable given the public nature of the services involved and also finding 
noncompetition covenants outside of the authority of the corporate charters of the 
contracting parties); Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15, 20–21 (1873) (holding that a partial 
restraint is “not specially injurious to the public” where “every other person except the 
[covenantor] is still at liberty to engage in the same business within the same limits”); see 
also Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 163 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839) (finding no monopoly 
where the noncompetition covenant “only secures the plaintiff in the exclusive enjoyment of 
his business as against a single individual, while all the world beside are left at full liberty to 
enter upon the same enterprise”). 
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supply as creating a monopoly and held that agreements in furtherance of 
schemes to monopolize the market were void and unenforceable.108  These 
courts analogized a de facto exclusive right to sell goods or services in an 
area to a monopoly created by a prerogative or legislative grant and held 
that the contracts that furthered a private monopoly were void and 
unenforceable in the absence of a legislative grant.109  Still other courts 
analogized these restraints to forestalling, regrating, and engrossing—old 
English statutory crimes with a long and storied history that some 
nineteenth century observers equated with “cornering” a market.110  
Whether or not forestalling, regrating, or engrossing technically remained 
 
 108. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co., 65 Ga. at 162–63 (finding that agreements “entered into 
to cripple and prevent competition, and that they thereby enable the plaintiff in error to fix its 
tariff of rates at a maximum . . . are not favored by the law; they are against the public 
policy, because they tend to create monopolies, and are in general restraint of trade”); Craft, 
79 Ill. at 349 (characterizing a combination of all of the grain merchants in a town to fix 
prices and pool profits as an illegal attempt “to control and monopolize the entire grain trade 
of the town and surrounding country”); Richardson v. Buhl, 43 N.W. 1102 (Mich. 1889) 
(finding that the purpose of the Diamond Match Company was to monopolize the 
manufacture and sale of friction matches in the United States and holding that contracts in 
furtherance of this scheme were void and unenforceable); Arnot, 68 N.Y. at 567–69 (holding 
that where a defendant’s purpose was to obtain control over the sale of all anthracite coal in 
the Elmira market in order to raise prices, and where the plaintiff had knowledge of this 
purpose, a contract between the plaintiff and defendant that prevented the plaintiff from 
selling coal in Elmira was void and unenforceable); Cent. Ohio Salt, 35 Ohio St. at 672 
(finding that the “clear tendency” of an agreement among essentially all of the territory’s salt 
manufacturers to fix prices and control production through an association was “to establish a 
monopoly, and to destroy competition in trade, and for that reason, on grounds of public 
policy” refusing to enforce the agreement); see also State v. Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. 
155, 161 (Neb. 1890) (finding that the purpose of the Whiskey Trust was “to control prices, 
prevent production, and create a monopoly of the most offensive character”). 
 109. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co., 65 Ga. at 162–63 (holding void and unenforceable 
contracts providing Western Union the exclusive right to erect telegraph lines along the 
rights of way of the contracting railroads); FREDERICK H. COOKE, THE LAW OF TRADE AND 
LABOR COMBINATIONS 94–95 (1898) (“Within a comparatively recent period, the conception 
of a monopoly has been extended from a right created by government to a condition 
produced by the acts of mere individuals; thus, where, within a given area, all sales of a 
given article are made by a single individual or set of individuals.” (footnote omitted)). 
 110. See, e.g., Raymond v. Leavitt, 9 N.W. 525, 526 (Mich. 1881).  Originally, 
forestalling was the buying or selling of foodstuffs and other necessities of life outside of an 
officially established fair or other marketplace and then reselling them in the market, 
presumably at higher prices; regrating was a form of arbitrage:  the buying of necessities in 
one fair and reselling them in the same area; engrossing was a form of forward contract:  the 
buying of crops in the field with the intent to resell them once harvested. See 5 & 6 Edw. 6, 
c. 14 (1552) (Eng.), reprinted in 5 Stat. 377 (1763) (Eng.) (defining terms).  Higher prices, 
while often incidental to these practices, were not the harm the English statutes sought to 
prevent.  Rather, in the medieval period when these laws emerged, local authorities such as 
manors, cities, and guilds had legally enforceable prerogative grants or customary rights to 
organize local markets, set conditions of trade, and collect taxes on goods sold.  Forestalling, 
regrating, and engrossing almost surely were declared crimes more to protect the rights of 
market organizers than to protect consumers from monopoly pricing. Later economic and 
political changes made these crimes obsolete, and by the early 1700s they had largely fallen 
into disuse and many of the statutes were repealed.  Even so, some later English courts held 
that these practices violated the common law if not statutory law. See R v. Waddington, 
(1800) 102 Eng. Rep. 56 (K.B.) 65; Rex v. Rusby, (1799) 170 Eng. Rep. 241. 
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indictable common law crimes under state law,111 the idea that cornering 
the market to increase prices above reasonable levels was against public 
policy and that the implementing restraints should not be enforceable 
retained traction. 
Overall, by the time of the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, the 
common law governing contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in 
restraint of trade in the United States was reasonably uniform in 
application, if not in principle.112  Restrictive covenants that were freely 
negotiated, ancillary to a legitimate business purpose, and did not threaten 
higher prices, reduced output, and other “evils of monopoly”113 were 
generally enforced, while those that restricted enough competitors to enable 
a contracting party or combination to harm the public interest by raising 
prices or reducing output were almost always held to be void as contrary to 
public policy.  But there are four aspects of the late nineteenth century 
common law worthy of note. 
First, for ancillary restraints in nonexecutory agreements (such as in the 
sale of a business), there was a tendency for courts to view, if not legally 
presume, freely negotiated restraints as reasonable and enforceable, 
regardless of how they constrained the contracting parties, in the absence of 
a showing that the effects of the restraints went beyond the parties and 
materially harmed the public interest.114  A reading of the cases at the time 
 
 111. In 1844, Parliament passed legislation reaffirming the repeal of all statutes 
prohibiting forestalling, regrating, and engrossing and declaring that these activities were not 
to be found criminal at common law. 7 & 8 Vict., c. 24 (1844) (U.K.).  The old notions of 
these crimes did not entirely disappear in the United States. See Taggart v. City of Detroit, 
38 N.W. 714, 718 (Mich. 1888) (noting that the charter of the City of Detroit always had the 
authority to prevent forestalling and regrating and that the city always had ordinances on 
these practices with respect to the city-operated public market to ensure that consumers 
could always deal directly with farmers and not through middlemen); NEW YORK 1889 
REPORT, supra note 61, at 7 (suggesting that forestalling, regrating, and engrossing were still 
indictable as common law misdemeanors in New York State).  For more on forestalling, 
regrating, and engrossing, especially as it relates to antitrust law, see Edward A. Adler, 
Monopolizing at Common Law and Under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 31 HARV. L. 
REV. 246, 251–63 (1917); Wendell Herbruck, Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing, 
27 MICH. L. REV. 365 (1929). 
 112. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 6 So. 888, 891 (La. 1889) (“We have 
been at great pains, and have devoted long and tedious labor, to examine all the authorities, 
consisting mainly of decisions rendered on the point by courts of last resort in this country, 
which were submitted to us by counsel in the case, and we reach the conclusion that 
American jurisprudence has firmly settled the doctrine that all contracts which have a 
palpable tendency to stifle competition, either in the market value of commodities or in the 
carriage or transportation of such commodities, are contrary to public policy, and are 
therefore incapable of conferring upon the parties thereto any rights which a court of justice 
can recognize or enforce.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51, 54 (1837); see also Bishop v. 
Palmer, 16 N.E. 299, 304 (Mass. 1888) (citing Alger, 36 Mass at 54); Newell v. Meyendorff, 
23 P. 333, 334 (Mont. 1890) (quoting Alger, 36 Mass. at 54). 
 114. See Leslie v. Lorillard. 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888) (“[C]ourts should refrain from 
the exercise of their equitable powers in interfering with and restraining the conduct of the 
affairs of individuals or of corporations, unless their conduct, in some tangible form, 
threatens the welfare of the public.”). 
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indicates that the burden of proving harm to the public interest from an 
ancillary restraint was a heavy one.  Significantly, however, no such 
presumption appears in combination cases for reciprocal, nonancilliary 
noncompetition restraints.  If anything, just the opposite was true.115  
Second, harm to the public interest almost always meant significant harm 
to competition reflected through increased prices and reduced output.  The 
judicial analysis of a restraint’s effect on prices and output, however, was 
not particularly sophisticated.  Courts depended on rather rudimentary 
notions of competitive constraint.  If, for example, the court found that there 
was sufficient actual rivalry between the combination and independent third 
parties to ensure price competition so that the combination could increase 
prices, the restraint did not threaten the public interest and hence was 
enforceable.  Even if actual competition from third parties was not present, 
if the court found that barriers to entry were low, and the challenged 
restraints did not affect third parties, the court could uphold the 
combination on the ground that a new entry would occur to protect the 
public if the combination raised prices above reasonably remunerative 
levels.116  Conversely, where the combination comprised most, if not all, of 
the competitors in the market, barriers to entry were high, and prices were 
fixed at levels not reflecting a competitive market, courts tended to find the 
restraints contrary to the public interest and unenforceable. 117 
Third, and somewhat relatedly, courts did not regard all price increases 
and output reductions as necessarily contrary to the public interest.  As 
discussed in the beginning of this section, there was significant concern in 
 
 115. See, e.g., Cleveland, C., C. & I. Ry. Co. v. Closser, 26 N.E. 159, 163 (Ind. 1890) 
(observing that the justification for a horizontal price-fixing combination “must be upon an 
affirmative showing, and one so full, complete, and clear as to remove the presumption (to 
which its existence of itself gives rise) that it was formed to do mischief to the public by 
repressing fair competition”). England did adopt the presumption that a freely negotiated 
horizontal combination was reasonable. See Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, [1892] 1 
A.C. 25. 
 116. See, e.g., Goodman v. Henderson, 58 Ga. 567, 570 (1877) (“It was argued that it 
tended to a monopoly, as the contracting parties were the only active parties engaged in 
purchasing such hides; but any others, we suggest, could engage, if they wished, and, if 
prices warranted, they certainly would do so.”); Leslie, 18 N.E. at 366 (finding a 
noncompetition clause enforceable where it restricted only the covenantee and did not 
exclude other competition); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 422 (N.Y. 1887) 
(“To the extent that the contract prevents the vendor from carrying on the particular trade, it 
deprives the community of any benefit it might derive from his entering into competition.  
But the business is open to all others, and there is little danger that the public will suffer 
harm from lack of persons to engage in a profitable industry.  Such contracts do not create 
monopolies.  They confer no special or exclusive privilege.”).  The Northern District of Ohio 
applied similar reasoning when it rejected an application for removal of the defendant to 
stand trial in the District of Massachusetts in a Sherman Act challenge to the Whiskey Trust, 
finding that the indictment was insufficient, as it did not allege that the Whiskey Trust 
exerted any control over production or prices of the 25 percent of distilleries in the country 
that it did not own. In re Corning, 51 F. 205, 210–11 (N.D. Ohio 1892). 
 117. See, e.g., Anderson v. Jett, 12 S.W. 670 (Ky. 1889); Cent. Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 
35 Ohio St. 666 (1880); Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346 (1875); Morris Run Coal Co. v. 
Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871); India Bagging Ass’n v. B. Kock & Co., 14 La. Ann. 
168 (1859); Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848). 
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the years prior to the passage of the Sherman Act about “ruinous,” 
“destructive,” or “excessive” competition, that is, competition that reduced 
prices to a level at which many producers in the market could not cover 
their costs or at least could not earn a fair or reasonable profit on their 
business.  Some courts observed that restraints designed to eliminate 
excessive competition and stabilize prices at a “reasonable” level among 
competitors served a legitimate public purpose and supported the 
reasonableness of a restrictive combination.118  While many of these same 
 
 118. See, e.g., Cleveland, 26 N.E. at 163 (assuming without deciding that there is a 
defense for a horizontal price-fixing combination, “it can only be so where it is affirmatively 
shown that its object was to prevent ruinous competition, and that it does not establish 
unreasonable rates, unjust discriminations, or oppressive regulations”); Sayre v. Louisville 
Union Benevolent Ass’n, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 143, 147 (1863) (“The public interest does not, we 
believe, forbid carriers from guarding themselves against undue competition, reducing 
freights below the standard of fair compensation; and we should hesitate to condemn an 
agreement between carriers not to carry goods for less than a certain, reasonable price.”); 
Cent. Shade-Roller Co. v. Cushman, 9 N.E. 629, 631 (Mass. 1887) (overruling a demurrer to 
enforce an agreement among three competing patentee-manufacturers to combine their 
patents and charge a uniform fixed price where the purpose of the arrangement was allegedly 
“to prevent the injurious effects, both to producers and consumers, of fluctuating prices 
caused by undue competition”); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 523–24, 527 
(Ct. App. 1880) (finding an agreement of twenty-three stone quarry operators in a district of 
St. Louis that did not embrace all competitors in St. Louis and was limited in time to be a 
partial restraint of trade and reasonable, where its purpose was to “secure a fair, 
proportionate sale of the produce of all quarries at uniform prices and living rates” and did 
not apparently tend “to deprive men of employment, unduly raise prices, cause a monopoly, 
or put an end to competition”); Manchester & L.R.R. v. Concord R.R., 20 A. 383, 384 (N.H. 
1890) (observing that “the lessons of experience, as well as the deductions of reason, amply 
demonstrate that the public interest is not subserved by competition which reduces the rate of 
transportation below the standard of fair compensation”); see also Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 
490, 521 (1875) (Christiancy, J.) (“The public is quite as much interested in the prosperity of 
its citizens in their various avocations as it can possibly be in their competition. The latter 
may bring low prices to purchasers, but may also bring them so low that capital becomes 
unprofitable and business men fail, to the general injury of the community.”); Leslie, 18 N.E. 
at 366 (“I do not think that competition is invariably a public benefaction, for it may be 
carried on to such a degree as to become a general evil.”);  ELISHA GREENHOOD, THE 
DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 683 (1886) (stating that the 
elimination of ruinous competition is a legitimate purpose of a restraint); 2 VICTOR 
MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1131, at 1096–97 (2d ed. 
1886) (same with respect to competing railroads).  Interestingly, Chief Judge Parker in 
Mitchel v. Reynolds arguably recognized destructive competition as legitimate grounds for a 
noncompetition covenant, at least when connected to the sale of a business. Mitchel v. 
Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B.) 350 (finding as the fourth grounds for upholding 
the restraint “to prevent a town from being overstocked with any particular trade”); accord 
Holmes v. Martin, 10 Ga. 503 (1851).  For an early American view, see Palmer v. Stebbins, 
20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 188, 192 (1825) (“I am rather inclined to believe, that in this country at 
least, more evil than good is to be apprehended from encouraging competition among rival 
tradesmen or men engaged in commercial concerns.”).  The court qualified its view in 
Palmer, which involved a contract providing for the exit of a rival boatman and an exclusive 
dealing covenant, by supposing that the beneficiary of the restrictive covenants would not 
enter into so many contracts as to obtain a monopoly. Id.; see also NEW YORK 1889 REPORT, 
supra note 61, at 5 (“Such contests [from excessive competition] often result in wounds 
which it takes long years to heal, and from them the public not only receive no real benefit, 
but positive injury rather, for sooner or later the public are expected to make good the losses 
which such ruinous policies entail.”). 
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courts recognized that a combination could raise prices above a reasonable 
price and that the restrictive covenants underlying such combinations 
should not be enforced,119 the idea that firms could legitimately combine to 
mitigate ruinous competition and raise prices minimally provided at least a 
moral justification for many combinations of the day.  But very few cases 
raised the defense that the combination was justified on the grounds of 
mitigating ruinous competition, and the common law did not develop any 
standard to determine whether a combination’s increased prices were within 
a permissible range. 
Fourth, despite the increasing dominance of the reasonableness test and 
its expansion to include the public’s interest in competition, the common 
law of contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, the 
test never lost its mooring to the protection of the covenantor from 
unreasonably broad restraints limiting its freedom of action in the 
marketplace.  As a result, contracts that imposed an unreasonable restraint 
on trade, while void and unenforceable, were not criminal, and therefore not 
subject to challenge by the state, nor did they give rise to a cause of action 
for damages or injunctive relief by injured third parties.120  It is difficult to 
find common law actions by a competitor excluded from the market due to 
restrictive covenants or by customers who paid higher prices than they 
would have in the absence of the restraint.  Although several jurisdictions, 
including New York, had enacted general conspiracy laws making it a 
misdemeanor for two or more persons to conspire to commit any act 
“injurious to . . . trade or commerce,”121 these statutes were rarely used to 
challenge anticompetitive combinations.122 
 
 119. See, e.g., Cleveland, 26 N.E. at 163; Sayre, 62 Ky. at 146–47; Cent. Shade-Roller 
Co., 9 N.E. at 631 (suggesting in dictum that if the purpose of the combination was to 
“unduly raise the price” above a fair level to the public detriment the combination would not 
be enforceable); see also Skrainka, 8 Mo. App. at 523–24, 527 (noting that restraint did not 
“unduly raise prices, cause a monopoly, or put an end to competition”).  
 120. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898), 
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); In re Greene, 52 F. 104, 111 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892).  For a 
contemporary review of the case law concluding that unlawful restraints of trade were 
generally not indictable at common law, see Arthur M. Allen, Criminal Conspiracies in 
Restraint of Trade at Common Law, 23 HARV. L. REV. 531 (1909). But cf. Raymond v. 
Leavitt, 9 N.W. 525, 526 (Mich. 1881) (noting that forestalling and engrossing were 
indictable misdemeanors under early English common law). 
 121. See Act of Dec. 10, 1828, § 8(6) (originally codified at 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. 689, 691–
92 (1829)); see also Act of Mar. 9, 1885, ch. 240, § 138 (originally codified at MINN. STAT. 
§ 6423(6) (1894)); An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, ch. 28, § 110, 1861 Nev. 
Stat. 79 (originally codified at NEV. GEN. STAT. § 4660 (1885)); An Act for the Punishment 
of Crimes (originally codified at N.J. REV. STAT. 256, 275, § 61 (1847), and recodified at 
N.J. REV. STAT. 121, 185, § 191 (1874)); Penal Code § 225(6) (1877) (originally codified at 
N.D. REV. CODE § 7037(6) (1895)); OKLA. STAT. ch. 25, § 2071(5) (1890)); Act of Feb. 17, 
1877 (originally codified at S.D. COMPILED LAWS § 6425(5) (1887)); Tenn. Code 
§§ 4789(7), 4825(6) (1858); Penal Code § 84 (originally codified at UTAH COMPILED LAWS 
§ 1914(5) (1876)).  Mississippi enacted a similar statute in 1892. See Act of Apr. 2, 1892 
(originally codified at MISS. CODE ANN. § 1006 (1892)). 
 122. For cases brought under the New York statute, see, for example, Leonard v. Poole, 
21 N.E. 707 (N.Y. 1889); Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848); Hooker & 
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There were also various artifacts in the laws of some jurisdictions 
lingering from much older English cases.  For example, some courts held 
that restrictive covenants among competitors could be void for public 
policy and unenforceable only if they were unreasonable and involved a 
staple or prime necessity.123  Some courts held that an otherwise valid 
partial restraint of trade would be unlawful and unenforceable if it involved 
goods or services with a “public” nature and the restraint was prejudicial to 
the public interest.124  But cases of this type do not detract from the central 
tendency of courts as a whole to refuse to enforce noncompetition 
covenants in combination agreements designed to increase prices and 
perhaps reduce output, even though the courts almost always enforced 
noncompetition agreements in connection with the sale of a business.  The 
upshot is that combinations could not depend on contracts to solve their 
enforceability problems. 
B.  Pools 
A special type of contractual combination is a pool.  In a pool, as in a 
simple combination, the contracting parties retain ownership of their 
properties and other assets and merely agree to abide by the rules laid down 
by the pool contract in conducting their respective business affairs.  What 
makes pools unique is that they aggregate some common attributes related 
to production, typically profits or output, and then reallocate the common 
factor to the pool members in agreed proportions, independently of what 
any individual firm may have actually contributed.  In the late nineteenth 
century, pools were used extensively by the railroads and other businesses, 
some national and some local, including cordage, anthracite coal, 
meatpacking, cast iron pipe, steel rails, whiskey, sandpaper, wallpaper, and 
bagging.125 
The Michigan Salt Association provides an excellent example of a pool’s 
operation.126  In 1860, salt production began in the extensive brine fields 
 
Woodward v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847); People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835); see also Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871) 
(holding that a contract entered into in New York, between Pennsylvania coal companies, 
that violates the New York statute will not be enforced by Pennsylvania courts).  In 
interpreting the New York statute, New York courts looked to the common law. See N.Y. 
STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NEW YORK ANTITRUST 
LAWS 3a (1957). 
 123. See Cent. Shade-Roller Co. v. Cushman, 9 N.E. 629, 631 (Mass. 1887); see also 
Raymond v. Leavitt, 9 N.W. 525, 526 (Mich. 1881) (noting the sensitivity of the common 
law to restraints on wheat and other “indispensable” articles). 
 124. See, e.g., Chi. Gaslight & Coke Co. v. People’s Gaslight & Coke Co., 13 N.E. 169, 
175 (Ill. 1887); W. Va. Transp. Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600, 620 (1883). 
 125. A number of early pooling agreements are reprinted in INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS 
AND TRUSTS, supra note 66, at 4–10 (agreement between distillers); id. at 10–12 (agreement 
between envelope manufacturers). 
 126. A detailed analysis of the operation of the Michigan salt pool is contained in J.W. 
Jenks, The Michigan Salt Association, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 78 (1888). 
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around Saginaw.127  Salt production involves pumping the brine out of the 
ground and refining it into purified product.  Capital costs of a production 
facility were relatively small, making entry easy.  Operating costs were also 
small, since the primary variable cost was energy, which most salt-well 
operators obtained from burning sawdust and other waste products from the 
Michigan sawmills.128  Production was limited only by the capacity to 
pump and refine, since the brine was virtually inexhaustible in the 
underground brine fields.  As a result of these conditions, over time 
competition among salt-well operators became intense and prices fell to 
levels around marginal costs, making it difficult for producers to make a 
meaningful profit or perhaps even cover their fixed costs.  To deal with this 
situation—a paradigmatic case of what was viewed at the time as excessive 
competition—in 1876, the Michigan producers organized the Michigan Salt 
Association.129  Under the Association’s bylaws, shares in the association 
could be held only by member salt manufacturers, with one share issued for 
each barrel of the member’s average daily production.130  Upon becoming a 
member, each manufacturer was required to contract to sell its entire 
production to the Association, which would then be responsible for selling 
it.131  Members received profits from the Association’s sales as dividends 
on their shares.  This pooling of sales mitigated each member’s incentive to 
increase production and increased the incentive to cooperate with other 
members to reduce production in order to increase the market price. 
Pools suffer from the same incentive compatibility problems as simple 
agreements:  each individual member has an incentive to cheat on the pool’s 
rules by producing extra product and selling outside of the pool while 
taking advantage of the higher prices that the pool created.  The apparent 
advantage of a pool is that cheating is easier to detect, since individual 
members have ostensibly less independence.  Even so, the collective effect 
of several cheaters caused many pools to disintegrate.132  But, as in the case 
of simple combinations designed to restrict output and raise prices, courts 
were hostile and almost always found pooling agreements void and 
unenforceable as contracts or combinations restraining trade under the 
common law.133  Indeed, pools were found by some courts to be even more 
 
 127. See id. at 79–80. 
 128. See id. at 86. 
 129. See id. at 83–84. 
 130. See id. at 85. 
 131. See id. at 85–86. 
 132. For one example, see ELIOT JONES, THE ANTHRACITE COAL COMBINATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 40–58 (1914). 
 133. See, e.g., Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 346–47 (1875) (entering a profit pooling 
agreement among grain dealers); Anderson v. Jett, 12 S.W. 670 (Ky. 1889) (profit pooling 
among competing riverboats on the Kentucky River); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 
6 So. 888 (La. 1889) (pooling between two competing railroads); Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 
434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) (pooling among all transportation lines on the Erie and Oswego 
canals); Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 24 N.E. 660 (Ohio 1890) (per curiam) (pooling 
agreement among candle manufacturers); Cent. Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 
(1880) (pooling agreement among Ohio salt manufacturers); Hoffman v. Brooks, 3 Ohio 
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nefarious than price-fixing combinations:  when an agreement fixes only 
the prices to be charged, rivals can compete away excess profits by 
engaging in non-price competition; however, the common property resource 
nature of a pool eliminates much of the incentive to engage in either price 
or non-price competition.134 
C.  Corporations 
Nor was the corporation generally available as a vehicle in which to 
organize combinations.  A corporation is an artificial legal person created 
by the state distinct from the persons who own or operate it.  As an artificial 
person, a corporation has only the powers and attributes that the state 
confers on it, either expressly in the corporation’s charter or incidental to 
the corporation’s express powers.135  In creating corporations, states 
typically permitted them to hold property, sue and be sued, adopt rules for 
their internal governance, exist independently of the persons that created it, 
and, in many states by the mid-nineteenth century, limited the liability of 
shareholders to the corporation’s creditors.136  Corporations, with 
ownership interests that are readily divisible, transferable, and expandable 
and an existence that is defined by a charter without regard to the lives of 
the shareholders, are especially attractive vehicles for businesses that 
require large amounts of investment capital and pay returns over long 
periods of time.  Individuals and even partnerships typically could not 
muster the resources to engage in many capital intensive enterprises, 
particularly in transportation and finance.  Unless the state found some 
other private vehicle to undertake the activity, it would be forced into 
providing the service itself.  Private corporations provided the vehicle.  
Private corporations could raise the required capital in private markets, 
assume the business risks of the endeavor, and relieve state and local 
governments from the need for providing financing and operating the 
enterprise.  To aid private corporations in their public endeavors, states 
often included in the early corporation charters such benefits as a favorable 
tax status or exemption from taxation altogether, exclusivity rights to shield 
the corporation from competition, and particularly in the case of public 
 
Dec. Reprint 517 (Super. Ct. 1884) (pooling agreement among Cincinnati tobacco 
warehousemen) (full report in 23 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 648 (1884)); McBirney & Johnston 
White Lead Co. v. Consol. Lead Co., 9 WKLY. CINCINNATI L. BULL. 258 (Super. Ct. 1883); 
Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 175–78 (1871) (pooling agreement 
among five coal companies). 
 134. See, e.g., Anderson, 12 S.W. at 671. 
 135. The seminal expression is in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only 
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence.”); accord Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 43 U.S. 305, 
312 (1892) (“A corporation being the mere creature of the legislature, its rights, privileges, 
and powers are dependent solely upon the terms of its charter.”). 
 136. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 
592–94 (1986). 
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utility and transportation companies, an award of designated state police 
powers such as eminent domain.137  These benefits enabled the corporation 
more easily to attract investment and lower its costs of money and 
operation.138 
For the same reasons that corporations were attractive for use in “public” 
enterprises, they were distrusted for use in pursuing private interests.  
Corporations were suspect in the mind of the public because of their 
universally large size and their taint of state prerogative.139  The corporate 
form provided opportunities for the accumulation and concentration of 
wealth that were not available to natural entities, and which threatened a 
fundamental shift in the balance of economic and political power from 
individual to business enterprises.  The special powers conferred on some 
corporations in their charters added insult to injury, for while many used 
their state-granted powers for good, there undoubtedly were other instances 
when special corporations either obtained benefits that were not 
indispensable or took untoward advantage of those that were required. 
Originally, corporations were individually created by the grant of a 
corporate charter by the incorporating state legislature.140  Corporations 
created by a tailored, individual charter are known as “special 
corporations.”  For most of the history of special business corporations, 
these special charters were rarely granted and were always issued to enable 
the new corporation to perform a quasipublic function that required 
significantly more capital than a family or group of associates could 
raise.141  Special corporations were typically chartered to operate banks, 
insurance companies, transportation companies, and public works.142  The 
function of a special corporation was specifically identified in the 
corporation’s charter, and a corporation was not authorized to engage in 
activities that were not reasonably incidental to the corporation’s chartered 
functions.  Given the public nature of their functions, special corporations 
were often granted special powers and privileges, which could include 
quasigovernmental powers.  In the case of a transportation company, for 
example, the charter might provide the corporation with the power of 
 
 137. See, e.g., Hugh L. Sowards & James S. Mofsky, Factors Affecting the Development 
of Corporation Law, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 476, 480–81 (1969); see also EDWIN MERRICK 
DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 44 (1954). 
 138. See, e.g., Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 137, at 480–81; see also DODD, supra note 
137, at 202–41 (1954). 
 139. See J. WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at 30–47 (1970). 
 140. See JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY:  BUSINESS AND 
POLITICS, 1791–1875, at 6–7 (1949) (recounting the New Jersey experience); DODD, supra 
note 137, at 196. 
 141. See HURST, supra note 139, at 15, 17–18; SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784–1855, at 47–48, 73–74 (1982). 
 142. See Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365 (N.Y. 1888) (“In the granting of charters 
the legislature is presumed to have had in view the public interest, and public policy is (as 
the interest of stockholders ought to be) concerned in the restriction of corporations within 
chartered limits, and a departure therefrom is only deemed excusable when it cannot result in 
prejudice to the public or to the stockholders.”). 
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eminent domain and the authority to set toll rates.143  With the increasing 
use of the power loom in the early nineteenth century, some states, notably 
Massachusetts, began granting charters to manufacturing corporations to 
enable the creation of capital-intensive factories, presumably to increase the 
wealth and employment in local economies.144  
Gradually, states began to recognize that, by making corporate vehicles 
more freely available and eliminating any special powers, corporations 
would lose any advantages associated with their scarcity and positions of 
privilege.  States first began granting increasing numbers of special 
corporation charters, taking care not to include in these charters provisions 
that would confer monopoly privileges.  To this end, states often chartered 
multiple corporations to build competing gas lines or other public works in 
a given city or chartered multiple railroads to build competing lines.145  
Courts also construed these charters narrowly and refused to find monopoly 
rights by implication.146 
Once the demand for special charters began to overwhelm state 
legislatures, some states started to dispense with the need for individually 
enacted charters and instead made corporate charters with standardized 
powers and limitations automatically available upon request.147  
Corporations created in this manner are known as “general corporations” 
and are created pursuant to a general corporation law.  In 1811, New York 
 
 143. See, e.g., Bonaparte v. Camden & A. R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) 
(No. 1617) (upholding eminent domain powers of railroad corporation); Chesapeake & O. 
Canal Co. v. Key, 5 F. Cas. 563 (C.C.D.D.C. 1829) (No. 2649) (upholding eminent domain 
power granted to canal corporation); State v. Town of Hampton, 2 N.H. 22 (1819) 
(upholding eminent domain powers granted to a turnpike corporation).  
 144. For more on the power loom, see 1 VICTOR S. CLARK, HISTORY OF MANUFACTURES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 428–30 (1916); CAROLINE F. WARE, THE EARLY NEW ENGLAND 
COTTON MANUFACTURE:  A STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL BEGINNINGS 63–64 (1931).  For more on 
the history of Massachusetts manufacturing in the wake of the mechanization of the textile 
industry, see E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry:  
Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1355‒56 (1948).   
 145. See, e.g., Chic. Gaslight & Coke Co. v. People’s Gaslight & Coke Co., 13 N.E. 169, 
174 (Ill. 1887) (noting that the Illinois state legislature specially chartered two gas 
companies to supply gas to Chicago in order to end a monopoly). But cf. The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (upholding a twenty-five-year monopoly grant by 
the Louisiana legislature for slaughter-houses as a valid exercise of the state’s police power). 
 146. See, e.g., Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 548–49 (1837) (construing the corporate charter for Charles River 
Bridge to not preclude construction of Warren Bridge over the Charles River); see also 
People ex rel. Peabody v. Chi. Gas Trust Co., 22 N.E. 798, 804 (Ill. 1889) (noting the Illinois 
policy after 1870 of not granting exclusive privileges to corporations of any kind). 
 147. The burden on the legislature could be substantial.  Larcom reports that between 
1885 and 1897, when Delaware adopted a constitutional provision prohibiting special 
incorporation, acts authorizing special incorporations and those granting divorces accounted 
for roughly half of the laws passed by the Delaware legislature. RUSSELL CARPENTER 
LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 7 (1937).  Political influence in obtaining special 
incorporation and the powers and privileges granted also appeared to be a problem. See 
CADMAN, supra note 140, at 10–11; LARCOM, supra, at 5–7 (1937); Henry N. Butler, 
Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 141 (1985). 
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passed the first general corporation law, although it was limited to certain 
types of manufacturing (principally in textile, glass, metal, and paint 
industries) and imposed a maximum capitalization of $100,000.148  In 1837, 
Connecticut dispensed with the purpose limitations when it passed a general 
incorporation statute enabling anyone to form a corporation for any “lawful 
business.”149  By 1875, twenty-five of the then thirty-seven states had 
adopted constitutional provisions either prohibiting special charters 
altogether or granting them with only rare exceptions.150  By the end of 
1890, thirty-four of the then forty-four states had adopted similar 
constitutional provisions.151 
The emerging general corporation laws, however, did not satisfy the 
needs of most large multistate business combinations.  The original idea of 
a general corporation was limited:  general corporations were conceived not 
as massive business enterprises but rather as local “incorporated 
partnerships.”152  Corporations formed under these laws were typically 
subject to low capitalization limitations.  New York had one of the highest 
maximum capitalization limits, but it was only $2 million in 1875 and 
$5 million in 1881.153  Many states limited the duration of corporate 
 
 148. Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67, 1811 N.Y. Laws 151; see Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 
456, 457 (N.Y. 1822). See generally W.C. Kessler, A Statistical Study of the New York 
General Incorporation Act of 1811, 48 J. POL. ECON. 877 (1940); Ronald E. Seavoy, Laws 
To Encourage Manufacturing:  New York Policy and the 1811 General Incorporation 
Statute, 46 BUS. HIST. REV. 85 (1972). 
 149. Act of June 10, 1837, ch. 63, 1837 Conn. Pub. Acts 49, § 2. 
 150. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550 n.5 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(collecting provisions); LARCOM, supra note 147, at 3 n.7 (listing adoptions of state 
constitutional provision by year).  New York, in its Constitution of 1846, appears to be the 
first state to adopt a constitutional provision requiring incorporation under the general laws 
and prohibiting special incorporation except under limited circumstances. See N.Y. CONST. 
of 1846, art. VIII, § 1.  The constitutions of Maine and Maryland also permitted special 
incorporation when the objects of incorporation could not be obtained through general 
incorporation. See LARCOM, supra note 147, at 3 n.7. 
 151. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 550 n.5; LARCOM, supra note 147, at 3 n.7.  For more on the 
development of general incorporation laws, see, for example, JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, 
ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS (1917); HURST, supra note 
139; SEAVOY, supra note 141; Butler, supra note 147, at 154–56; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., 
Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886–1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 28 
(1936); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 
5 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1945); Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for 
Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey:  1880–1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323 
(2007). 
 152. See Slee, 19 Johns. at 473 (“The object and intention of the legislature in authorizing 
the association of individuals for manufacturing purposes, was, in effect, to facilitate the 
formation of partnerships, without the risks ordinarily attending them, and to encourage 
internal manufactures.”). 
 153. Act of May 18, 1881, ch. 295, § 11, 1881 N.Y. Laws 400, 400 (increasing maximum 
to $5 million); General Business Corporation Act of June 21, 1875, ch. 611, § 11, 1875 N.Y. 
Laws 755, 758 (increasing maximum to $2 million); Liggett, 288 U.S. at 550–54 & nn.5–26 
(reviewing state capitalization limitations). 
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existence to periods of twenty to fifty years.154  Many states also limited the 
indebtedness of a corporation to an amount not to exceed the corporation’s 
capital stock or, in some states, even a lower amount.155  To ensure that 
corporations were not undercapitalized, the “trust fund” doctrine denied 
shareholders limited liability by making them personally responsible for the 
acts of the corporation in cases of insolvency to the extent that they had 
failed to pay the full value for their shares, and some states imposed double 
liability on shareholders until the corporation was fully capitalized.156  
States retained the power to revoke the charter of a corporation that the state 
created if the corporation operated in violation of state law or beyond the 
scope of its charter. 
Moreover, until the late nineteenth century, corporations were effectively 
unable to conduct any substantial operations outside of their state of 
incorporation.157  Businesses for the most part were local and, when 
incorporated, states expected their corporations to operate within their 
jurisdictions.  Some states simply did not permit their corporations to 
conduct out-of-state operations, and those that did often imposed 
restrictions on how much business could be conducted in a foreign state.158  
The Supreme Court spoke to the ability of states to regulate corporations 
operating within their jurisdiction in 1839 in the landmark case of Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle.159  Chief Justice Roger Taney observed that a corporation 
“can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by 
which it is created,”160 and, assuming that its charter permits so, it may 
operate in another state but only with the authorization of the host state.161  
The Court also rejected the argument that a corporation was entitled to the 
protections of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the 
Constitution162 as the corporation’s incorporators would themselves be.163  
In 1851, in the equally significant case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens,164 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that states had broad discretion in regulating 
businesses within their jurisdiction, so long as the regulated conduct was so 
local in nature as to admit diverse treatment and not impinge on interstate 
 
 154. In 1903, twenty-two of the then forty-five states limited corporate existence to 
periods of twenty to fifty years, although some states permitted renewals. See REPORT OF THE 
COMM. ON CORP. LAWS OF MASS. 162–64 (1903) [hereinafter MASS. CORP. REPORT]. 
 155. See id. at 165–67. 
 156. 1 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
§ 116 (1891). 
 157. See, e.g., MASS. CORP. REPORT, supra note 154, at 18 (noting that the operation of 
foreign corporations in Massachusetts was “not general” until after 1893 or so). 
 158. In 1865, for example, New Jersey amended its general incorporation law to permit 
its corporations to operate in part out of the state, but required that “a majority of the persons 
associated in the organization of such company shall be citizens and residents of this state.” 
Act of Mar. 16, 1865, 1865 N.J. Laws 354, ch. 201, § 1. 
 159. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). 
 160. Id. at 588. 
 161. Id. at 588–89. 
 162. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 163. Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 586–87. 
 164. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
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commerce.165  The clearest statement of the state’s authority to regulate 
foreign corporations came in Paul v. Virginia,166 decided in 1868, when the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that a foreign corporation was not a 
“citizen” of any state for the purposes of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment167 and therefore was not protected by 
that clause from discriminatory licensing and bonding requirements 
favoring domestic corporations.168  Paul reaffirmed that the recognition of 
foreign corporations was purely a matter of comity and not required as a 
matter of federal law.  As a result of these cases, through most of the time 
prior to the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, state and local officials 
acted freely to improve the competitive positions of local businesses 
relative to foreign firms by enacting appropriately restrictive, if not outright 
discriminatory, inspection, consumer protection, licensing, and even tax 
laws.169 
Nor could corporations circumvent the problems by creating 
domestically incorporated subsidiaries.  During the 1870s and 1880s, states 
continued to restrict corporations in their ability to hold stock in other 
corporations, so that a multistate combination could not use a holding 
company structure to secure the advantages of domestic incorporation for 
its operating subsidiaries.  The law was well-settled that corporations had 
no implied right to purchase or hold shares in another corporation for the 
purpose of controlling its management or even as an investment,170 and 
explicit charter authorizations to hold shares were rare.171  In addition, 
where a consolidation was to be effected through the acquisition of assets 
 
 165. See id. at 320–21. 
 166. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). 
 167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 168. Paul, 75 U.S. at 168. 
 169. For a discussion of local protectionist legislation of the period, see, for example, 
Stanley C. Hollander, Nineteenth Century Anti-drummer Legislation in the United States, 
38 BUS. HIST. REV. 479 (1964); Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing 
Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631 (1978).  For an 
excellent review of the doctrinal problems confronting corporations operating outside their 
state of incorporation, see Note, The Adoption of the Liberal Theory of Foreign 
Corporations, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 956 (1931).  For an account of corporate tax obligations at 
this time, see THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 486 
(1868). 
 170. See, e.g., Sumner v. Marcy, 23 F. Cas. 384 (C.C.D. Me. 1847) (No. 13,609); Cent. 
R.R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582, 620–21 (1869); People ex rel. Peabody v. Chi. Gas Trust 
Co., 22 N.E. 798 (Ill. 1889); Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Inst. for Savings, 68 Me. 43, 45 
(1877); Cent. R.R. of N.J. v. Pa. R.R., 31 N.J. Eq. 475, 494 (1879); Franklin Bank of 
Cincinnati v. Commercial Bank of Cincinnati, 36 Ohio St. 350 (1881). See generally 
CHARLES T. BOONE, A MANUAL OF THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CORPORATIONS § 107 (1881); 
1 MORAWETZ, supra note 118, §§ 431, 433; WALTER CHADWICK NOYES, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS § 264 (2d ed. 1909). 
 171. Some corporations also were expressly granted the right to have their stock 
subscribed to by other corporations.  For an account of the permissibility of stock ownership 
by special corporations prior to 1888, see William Randall Compton, Early History of Stock 
Ownership by Corporations, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 125 (1940). 
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rather than voting securities, states could hold the acquisition contract void 
and unenforceable if the state determined that the acquisition was made in 
furtherance of a scheme of monopolization.172  While a corporation might 
be useful as a vehicle for a local combination, all state general corporation 
laws restricted the operation of a corporation to “lawful purposes” and a 
corporation used to coordinate a combination was subject to attack as 
operating ultra vires.173  The general rule was that a corporate purpose that 
had the effect of creating a monopoly of the type void under common law 
was equally void under state corporation law.174  Moreover, another form 
was required to accommodate the demands for a business vehicle capable of 
combining and managing large multistate business operations. 
D.  Trusts 
The necessary legal innovation for large multistate combinations came in 
1879 with the creation of the original Standard Oil Trust, which was 
rewritten in 1882.175  The creation of the Standard Oil Trust is usually 
regarded as the beginning of the trust movement. 
Trusts are creations of the law of equity that separate the legal and 
beneficial interests in a group of assets.  The basic notion is that one or 
more trustees hold the legal title to the trust property (the trust “res”) for the 
benefit of one or more beneficiaries.  As a matter of property law, the 
trustees have the full legal authority to deal with third parties with respect to 
the trust res, but at the same time have a fiduciary obligation to exercise a 
high standard of care and selflessness in managing the res for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries.  The interests of the beneficiaries can be defined at the 
trust’s creation, and the trustees’ duty to act as directed in the trust 
instrument—or, in the absence of explicit direction, in the best interests of 
the beneficiaries—are enforceable in courts of equity.  Applied to the world 
of business, the trust, like a corporation, is a vehicle in which a large 
number of individuals can aggregate their resources in order to create and 
manage a large enterprise, with the trustees acting much like the directors of 
 
 172. See, e.g., W. Wooden-Ware Ass’n v. Starkey, 47 N.W. 604 (Mich. 1890) (voiding an 
asset purchase contract, where the contract contained a covenant restricting seller from 
reentering wooden-ware business for five years in any one of seven states); Richardson v. 
Buhl, 43 N.W. 1102 (Mich. 1889) (voiding a contract to acquire a friction match plant where 
the defendant’s Diamond Match Company had been organized for the purpose of acquiring 
all such plants in the United States). 
 173. See, e.g., Peabody, 22 N.E. at 798, 802–03 (describing a general corporation
organized to hold and sell the capital stock of gas or electric companies operating in Chicago 
or elsewhere in Illinois and in fact holding a majority of the stock of all four Chicago 
operating gas companies). 
 174. Id. at 803 (“If contracts and grants, whose tendency is to create monopolies are void 
at common law, then where a corporation is organized under a general statute, a provision in 
the declaration of its corporate purposes, the necessary effect of which is the creation of a 
monopoly, will also be void.”). 
 175. The 1879 and 1882 trust agreements are reprinted in INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS 
AND TRUSTS, supra note 66, at 14–27.  The 1882 trust agreement is also reprinted in State ex 
rel. Att’y Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, 281–84 (Ohio 1892). 
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a corporation.  But since a trust was not technically a corporation, it did not 
require a state grant to exist, was not subject to the state regulation of 
corporations, and was not prohibited from holding stock in multiple 
corporations in multiple states. 
The 1882 Standard Oil Trust, which became the model for other trusts, 
illustrates the formation and operation of a trust.176  The 1882 agreement 
was joined by all of the stockholders and members of fourteen corporations 
and limited partnerships, the controlling stockholders and members of an 
additional twenty-six corporations and limited partnerships, and forty-six 
individuals, all of whom would be the beneficiaries of the trust.  The trust 
agreement contemplated that separate corporations would be organized 
initially in Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.  Each trust 
beneficiary would transfer its assets to the Standard Oil Company in the 
state in which the assets were located, and in return the beneficiary received 
stock of the recipient Standard Oil Company equal at par to the appraised 
value of the transferred assets.  The beneficiaries would then deliver the 
stock they received in the constituent corporations to a board of trustees to 
be held in trust, and in turn the beneficiary would receive one “Standard Oil 
Trust” certificate for every $100 of stock it contributed.  Dividends paid on 
the constituent Standard Oil Company stock would be received by the 
trustees—the legal owners of the stock—who in turn would pay dividends 
on the trust certificates.  The nine-member board of trustees (each member 
to be elected for a staggered three-year term by a majority of votes 
representing the outstanding trust certificates) was given full power to vote 
the stock of the various Standard Oil Companies in its discretion and 
thereby control the operations of these companies.  The trust was to 
terminate twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor of the original 
nine trustees, unless dissolved beforehand by a specified supermajority vote 
of the outstanding trust certificates.177  When the Standard Oil Trust was 
formally dissolved in 1892, there were some 972,500 trust certificates 
 
 176. The details of the 1882 Standard Oil Trust first became public as the result of a New 
York State Senate investigation. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GENERAL LAWS ON THE 
INVESTIGATION RELATIVE TO TRUSTS, S. 111-50, at 8–10 (N.Y. 1888) [hereinafter NEW YORK 
1888 REPORT].  As a result, it is common to see 1882 as the year in which the trust 
movement started even though there was an earlier trust agreement in 1879.  The history of 
the Standard Oil Trust is examined in detail in IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE 
STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904).  For other treatments of the Standard Oil Trust, see, for 
example, Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); State ex rel. Att’y 
Gen., 30 N.E. at 279; INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN TRUSTS:  REPORT IN RELATION TO THE 
SUGAR TRUST AND STANDARD OIL TRUST, H.R. REP. NO. 50-3112 (1888); GILBERT HOLLAND 
MONTAGUE, THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1903); Elizabeth 
Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”:  The Standard Oil 
Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1996); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting:  The Standard Oil 
(N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958). 
 177. The drafters clearly had the rule against perpetuities in mind when drafting the trust 
agreement. 
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outstanding, representing a beneficial ownership in assets valued far more 
than the $97,250,000 represented by the face value of these certificates.178 
A true trust organized along the lines of the Standard Oil Trust model is 
known as a “trust proper.” Once the Standard Oil Trust structure became 
known, it was soon emulated in several other manufacturing industries.179  
Before the beginning of the next decade and the passage of the Sherman 
Act, groups of competitors had created at least five other major national 
trusts proper180: 
American Cotton Oil Trust, organized in 1884 with authorized capital of 
$40 million.181 
Linseed Oil Trust, organized in 1885 with authorized capital of 
$18 million182 
National Lead Trust, organized in 1887 with authorized capital of 
$90 million183 
Distillers and Cattle Feeders Trust (the Whiskey Trust), organized in 
1887 with authorized capital of $30.726 million.184 
Sugar Refineries Company (the Sugar Trust), organized in 1887 with 
authorized capital of $50 million.185 
 
 178. For the number of outstanding certificates upon dissolution, see U.S. Trust Co. v. 
Heye, 181 A.D. 544, 583 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918) (Dowling, J., dissenting), aff’d as modified, 
120 N.E. 645 (N.Y. 1918). 
 179. See Norbert Heinsheimer, The Legal Status of Trusts, 2 COLUM. L. TIMES 51, 53–54 
(1888) (describing the typical legal structure of trusts proper). 
 180. The amount of authorized capital is reported in Luther Conant, Jr., Industrial 
Consolidations in the United States, 53 PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT. ASS’N 1, 2–3 (1901).  
Seager and Gulick provide a description of the operations of the major trusts organized in the 
1880s. See HENRY R. SEAGER & CHARLES A. GULICK, JR., TRUST AND CORPORATION 
PROBLEMS (1929). 
 181. See NEW YORK 1888 REPORT, supra note 176, at 6–7. 
 182. For a description, see JOHN MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUSTS 54–55 (1904). 
 183. For a description of the formation and operation of the National Lead Trust, see 
Nat’l Lead Co. v. S.E. Grote Paint Store Co., 80 Mo. App. 247, 250–51 (Ct. App. 1899); 
Unckles v. Colgate, 72 Hun 119, 119–23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1893) (reprinting National Lead 
Trust agreement). 
 184. A description of the formation and operation of the Whiskey Trust is found in State 
v. Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. 155, 156–59 (Neb. 1890).  The trust deed is reprinted in 
INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND TRUSTS, supra note 66, at 36–42. For contemporary 
accounts of the Whiskey Trust, see 1 U.S. INDUS. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON TRUSTS 
AND INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS 74–93, 813–48 (1900); Jeremiah W. Jenks, The 
Development of the Whiskey Trust, 4 POL. SCI. Q. 296 (1889).  For a modern economic 
analysis, see Karen Clay & Werner Troesken, Further Tests of Static Oligopoly Models: 
Whiskey, 1882–1898, 51 J. INDUS. ECON. 151 (2003); Karen Clay & Werner Troesken, 
Strategic Behavior in Whiskey Distilling, 1887–1895, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 999 (2002); Werner 
Troesken, Exclusive Dealing and the Whiskey Trust, 1890–1895, 58 J. ECON. HIST. 755 
(1998).  
 185. The trust deed of The Sugar Refineries Company, dated as of August 16, 1887, is set 
forth in People v. N. River Sugar Refining Co., 24 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1890).  For a description 
of the trust, see NEW YORK 1888 REPORT, supra note 176, at 5–6; U.S. INDUS. COMM’N, 
supra note 184, at 59–74. 
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The deed of the Sugar Trust set forth its five purposes, which were not 
atypical of the public positioning of the major trusts: 
(1) To promote economy of administration and to reduce the cost of 
refining, thus enabling the price of sugar to be kept as low as is consistent 
with reasonable profit. (2) To give each refinery the benefit of all 
appliances and processes known or used by others, and useful to improve 
the quality and diminish the cost of refined sugar. (3) To furnish 
protection against unlawful combinations of labor. (4) To protect against 
inducements to lower the standard of refined sugars. (5) Generally to 
promote the interests of the parties hereto in all lawful and suitable 
ways.186 
A variety of more minor consolidations were also created in the late 1880s, 
including the Southern Cotton Oil Company, the National Cordage 
Company, the American Biscuit and Manufacturing Company, and the 
American Tobacco Company.187 
The trust proper solved one of the most serious problems undermining 
consolidations in the form of simple agreements or pools:  enforceability.  
As discussed, combinations designed to raise prices and reduce output face 
an incentive compatibility problem.  The members of the combination each 
have a profit-maximizing incentive to cheat on the combination by shaving 
prices or increasing output, even though they will all make more profits if 
they abide by the combination’s pricing and output rules.  Since the 
common law did not enforce contracts to implement these simple 
combinations and pools, they were often plagued by cheating problems.  
Trusts proper did not have this problem, since they did not rely on the 
restrictive contracts with legally independent firms as the means of 
controlling price and output.  Rather, trusts proper relied on control through 
ownership.  Although their constituent corporations may have been legally 
separate corporations or other entities, the trusts proper controlled the 
voting rights that elected the governing bodies of these entities.  While 
technically, as a shareholder, a trust could not command its constituent 
corporations to raise their prices, reduce their production, or cease 
operation, the trust could ensure that each constituent corporation’s 
directors—which the trust elected and which often were the trustees of the 
 
 186. People v. N. River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 586 (N.Y. 1890). 
 187. See Conant, supra note 180, at 2–3.  While each of these “trusts” was a consolidation 
of some form since they issued certificates at the holding company level, I have not 
confirmed that they were all organized as trusts proper.  Some of them were organized as 
corporations, such as the American Tobacco Company, while others may have been 
unincorporated associations.  There are also common references at the time to a variety of 
other trusts, such as the Preservers Trust, the Envelope Trust, the Salt Trust, the Oil-Cloth 
Trust, the Paving-Pitch Trust, the School-Slate Trust, the Chicago Gas Trust, the St. Louis 
Gas Trust, the New York Meat Trust, and the Paper-Bag Trust.  While some of these, 
including the Preserver’s Trust, were in fact trusts proper, most of them were likely to have 
been simple combinations.  The Preservers’ Trust agreement is reprinted in Bishop v. Am. 
Preservers Co., 41 N.E. 765, 768–71 (Ill. 1895). 
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trust188—would implement the trust’s directions.  Noncooperative directors 
were simply replaced by more compliant ones.  This same feature also 
increased the ability of the trust and its members to respond rapidly and 
effectively to changing business conditions. 
Moreover, on the supply side, trusts could take advantage of expanded 
trading areas, disseminate new technologies, and exploit new economies of 
scale in ways that were difficult if not impossible for simple combinations 
and pools.  When a trust proper decreased capacity, it could close the least 
efficient facilities in the trust network.  A common feature, at least of the 
major trusts proper, was a reduction in production levels, which was 
accomplished by closing the most inefficient facilities until the desired 
production level was achieved.  To this end, trusts often shut down many 
facilities after their acquisition.  For example, the Standard Oil Trust closed 
thirty-one of its fifty-two refineries within three years after its 1882 
reorganization, which reduced its average cost of production of refined oil 
from $0.15 to $0.005 per gallon.189  The Cotton Oil Trust, formed in 1884, 
closed thirteen of its fifty-two crude oil mills and three of its seven 
refineries.190  The Linseed Oil Trust, formed in 1885, closed twenty-one 
refineries.191  The Sugar Trust, formed in 1887 with eighteen members, 
quickly closed and dismantled seven refineries; combined eight other 
refineries into four, larger plants; and intermittently operated three 
additional plants to handle peak load demands or cover for plants that were 
closed for maintenance.192 
Finally, through careful coordination of its operations, trusts could 
attempt to exercise monopsony power to suppress the prices of inputs.  Just 
as a trust could contract production to raise prices of its output, the same 
contraction in output also reduced demand for inputs.  When a trust 
controlled enough purchases in the markets for its production inputs, this 
lowered the price of inputs, shifting wealth from suppliers to the trust.  
Moreover, even when the trust faced significant competition from third 
parties, it could bargain for discriminatorily lower prices than its 
competitors paid.  The canonical case is where the trust’s competitors were 
individually small, but collectively possessed a meaningful share of the 
input market, and where there were several suppliers with excess capacity 
from which the trust could purchase.  By threatening to move its large 
volume purchases from one supplier to another, the trust could successfully 
obtain significantly lower prices for its inputs than could its competitors. 
 
 188. When the Whiskey Trust acquired control of the Nebraska Distilling Co, for 
example, the trust replaced the Nebraska company’s board with three Whiskey Trust trustees 
and two former shareholders. See, e.g., Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. at 157. 
 189. ATACK & PASSELL, supra note 1, at 483. 
 190. 2 VICTOR S. CLARK, HISTORY OF MANUFACTURES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860–1893, 
at 520–21 (1929). 
 191. WHITNEY EASTMAN, THE HISTORY OF THE LINSEED OIL INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 31 (1968). 
 192. EICHNER, supra note 60, at 114–15. 
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Finally, an interesting feature of some, if not most trusts proper, is the 
issuance of stock or trust certificates as consideration when acquiring the 
stock or assets of the original independent trust members.  Simple 
combinations and pools did not acquire businesses or assets, so they had no 
need for a means of financing acquisitions.  Trusts proper, on the other 
hand, could issue certificates representing an equity interest in the assets 
held by the trust and an entitlement to a portion of the trust’s profits.  Trusts 
could simply create new certificates when they wished to make an 
acquisition without the need for seeking outside financing.  As long as the 
entitlements associated with the new stock did not dilute the interests of the 
existing trust certificates given the business or assets that the trust was 
acquiring, the existing trust certificate holders should be comfortable if not 
supportive of issuing new stock.  There were two reasons to believe that the 
acquisition would be accretive.  First, the major trust certificate holders 
were almost always the trustees, who would not want to dilute their own 
interests.  Second, to the extent that the acquisition increased the market 
power and hence the profitability of the trust, the acquisition would be 
accretive to existing trust certificate holders even if the trust paid fair value 
or even slightly above fair value for the acquisition. 
Moreover, the trusts could make their certificates more valuable to 
holders who might sell them in the secondary market if the certificates were 
“watered.”  Stock in corporations at the time was issued with a stated par 
value, that is, a value stated on the face of the certificate that purportedly 
represented the minimum capital that had been paid into the firm, and trust 
certificates also stated a par value.  In the early nineteenth century, the usual 
practice was for a subscriber to a corporation’s stock to only pay a small 
fraction of the par value initially for their subscribed shares, but the 
corporation had a call right for additional payments until the subscriber had 
paid the stock’s full par value.193  Moreover, under the “trust fund” 
doctrine, shareholders could be liable for the difference between the par 
value of the outstanding stock and the actual capital of the corporation.194  
While assessing whether par value was fully paid was straightforward when 
the stock was purchased for cash, it was much less certain and subject to 
abuse when the consideration was in kind, such as when a business or 
factory was sold for stock.  
Stock that was sold or exchanged by the corporation for a total 
consideration of less than par value was called “watered stock,” signifying 
that the increase in the corporation’s capital was less than the par value of 
 
 193. See DODD, supra note 137, at 74–84. 
 194. The trust fund doctrine was first enunciated by Justice Story in Wood v. Dummer, 
30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944), and recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. 610, 620–21 (1873).  As long as the capital paid into the firm was 
equal or greater than the aggregate par value of its outstanding stock, however, the stock was 
not considered watered and the shareholders not liable even if the original capital had been 
depleted or become worthless. 
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the stock.195  For example, if one share of stock newly issued by a 
corporation had a par value of $100 and was sold by the corporation for 
cash, then the corporation should have received at least $100.  If it received 
less than $100, then the stock was watered.  Trusts typically issued watered 
certificates.  A New York State Senate committee reported, for example, 
that the Sugar Trust had issued certificates with a par value representing 
capital of $45 million, four times the nominal amount of the stock in the 
member companies that the trust purchased.196  In purchasing the North 
River Sugar Refining Company, the trust exchanged certificates in the 
Sugar Refineries Company (an unincorporated association that served as the 
vehicle for the Sugar Trust) with a par value of $700,000 for North River 
stock for which the North River shareholders had negotiated a sales price of 
$325,000.197  Similarly, when the shareholders transferred their stock in the 
Nebraska Distilling Company (NDC), which had a negotiated valued of 
$100,000, to the Distillers’ & Cattle Feeders’ Trust, they received trust 
certificates in return with a face value of $285,700.198  Under the corporate 
law of the day, watered stock was a serious problem.  Par value, in effect, 
was a representation by the corporation and its management to its 
shareholders, creditors, and potential investors in the secondary market of 
the minimum value of the corporation.  While the original sellers to the 
trust may have been aware of the watered nature of the trust certificates 
they received in exchange (as the North River shareholders surely were), 
trust certificates were transferrable and purchasers in the secondary market 
could unknowingly pay highly inflated values for the certificates.  In any 
event, whatever protections a state’s corporation law tried to create for 
creditors and investors in the secondary market did not apply to trusts 
proper, which were not corporations.  As a result, watered trust certificates 
were an open invitation to fraud for which there was little recourse.  Many 
also believed that watered stock resulted in higher prices for the products of 
the trusts, the idea being that investors expected a return on their capital, 
which was represented by the par value of their trust certificates, and to 
make up for the phantom capital in the watered certificates the trust would 
have to charge higher prices.199  
State attorneys general, and then state legislatures, were the first to 
respond to the emergence of trusts proper.200  The loss of employment from 
shuttered plants, outrage from local competitors threatened with the 
 
 195. See WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS AND GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW §§ 21–22, at 28–30 (2d ed. 1889); ARTHUR L. HELLIWELL, A TREATISE 
ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS §§ 145‒56, at 243‒79 (1904).  
 196. NEW YORK 1888 REPORT, supra note 176, at 5–6. 
 197. See N. River Sugar, 24 N.E. at 838. 
 198. Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. at 157. 
 199. See EDWARD SHERWOOD MEADE, TRUST FINANCE 295 (1903). 
 200. Stimson, in an article in the first volume of the Harvard Law Review, collected a 
number of arguments that states might use against the trust device and urged the states to 
prosecute vigorously these enterprises. Frederick J. Stimson, “Trusts,” 1 HARV. L. REV. 132 
(1887); see also William F. Dana, “Monopoly” Under the National Antitrust Act, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 338, 348–49 (1894) (collecting citations of state prosecutions). 
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destruction of their businesses, and at least the perception of higher prices 
charged to customers (and at times lower prices paid to suppliers) made the 
successful trusts an attractive target, at least in those states where the 
targeted trust had not been successful in coopting the political machinery.  
Since the typical trust structure organized corporate operating companies at 
the state level, states initially turned to state corporation law as the means to 
attack the trusts.  As discussed earlier, corporations are creatures of the 
state, and the state is free to prescribe the conditions under which they will 
be created and will continue to exist.  In principle, if not in everyday 
practice, states held corporate management to a high fiduciary duty of care 
to operate the corporation consistent with the corporate charter and in the 
interests of the shareholders.  As a corollary, state corporation law required 
corporate management to operate the corporation themselves without 
outside interference.  Among other things, this meant that corporations 
could not enter into partnerships or other similar arrangements with third 
parties that would require them to subordinate the corporation’s interests to 
another entity201 or cease operating the business for which they were 
chartered at another entity’s direction.202  Corporations that abused their 
franchise to the public detriment, failed to pursue their stated purposes, and 
failed to operate solely in the interests of their shareholders could have their 
franchises revoked by the state in a judicial quo warranto proceeding 
brought on behalf of the state by the state’s attorney general.203 
Several states responded to public demands for actions against the trusts 
by initiating quo warranto proceedings to revoke the charters of domestic 
corporations participating as trust members.  These constituent corporations 
could be attacked on one or more of three distinct theories.  First, as a 
 
 201. See, e.g., Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 582 (1858) (declaring void 
a longstanding putative partnership between a corporation and an individual as outside the 
powers of the corporation); N. River Sugar, 24 N.E. at 841 (affirming the revocation of a 
corporate charter where the corporation violated its charter and failed to perform its 
corporate duties by joining and subordinating its interest to the Sugar Trust and closing its 
facilities pursuant to the trust’s instruction); Mallory v. Hananer Oil Works, 8 S.W. 396, 399 
(Tenn. 1888) (holding that it was unlawful for Hananer, a Tennessee corporation, to become 
a member of a partnership with three other Memphis-based corporations, independently of 
whether the partnership constituted an illegal combination to fix prices and control 
production of cottonseed oil in Memphis). See generally HELLIWELL, supra note 195, § 375, 
at 703‒05. 
 202. See, e.g., Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. at 161. 
 203. See Ward v. Farwell, 97 Ill. 593, 607 (1881) (“So, every private corporation, in 
accepting its charter, impliedly undertakes and agrees, upon condition of forfeiture, that it 
will exercise the rights and privileges conferred upon it in furtherance of the objects and 
purposes of its creation, and not otherwise, and that it will so manage and conduct its affairs 
that it shall not become dangerous or hazardous to the safety or well being of the State or 
community in and with which it transacts its business.”).  A writ of quo warranto is an order 
to the corporation to show by what authority it has exercised some power or performed some 
action.  For a discussion of the history of the quo warranto writ and its contemporary usage 
in the late nineteenth century, see, for example, JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON 
EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES, EMBRACING MANDAMUS, QUO WARRANTO AND 
PROHIBITION §§ 647–77a (2d ed. 1884); 5 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS ch. 157 (1895). 
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member of a trust thought to be operating contrary to the public interest—if 
not unlawfully—as a combination in restraint of trade or a monopoly, a 
corporate member could be deemed to have abused its corporate charter to 
the public detriment.204  Even the most liberal corporation enabling acts 
limited a corporation’s activities to lawful purposes, and a corporation that 
participated in such an unlawful combination in restraint of trade would 
have exceeded its powers and jeopardized its charter.  Second, many trusts 
closed down facilities they acquired, and if the plants of a corporate 
member were shuttered, the corporation could be found to have abandoned 
its chartered purposes.205  Third, in trust arrangements, the management of 
participating corporations took its directions from the trust administrators.  
Notwithstanding any efficiencies that may have resulted from the trust 
arrangement, or for that matter any benefits that may have accrued to the 
current shareholders of the participating corporations (the controlling 
trustees), the participation of a corporation in a trust had the effect of 
subordinating the interests of the corporation to the interests of trust 
organization as a whole contrary to state corporation law, which required 
corporations to be controlled by a board of directors acting independently of 
outside influence.206 
The first quo warranto action challenging participation in a trust was 
brought by Louisiana against a member of the American Cotton Oil Seed 
Trust.207  Following closely behind were attacks by New York in 1889 and 
California in 1890 against the Sugar Trust,208 by Ohio in 1890 against the 
Standard Oil Trust,209 and by Nebraska in 1890 against the Whiskey 
Trust.210 
New York’s challenge to the North River Sugar Refining Company 
illustrates the use of state corporation law to revoke the charter of a state 
 
 204. See, e.g., N. River Sugar, 24 N.E. at 839–41. 
 205. See, e.g., Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. at 156 (observing that of the seventy-five to 
eighty distilleries under the control of the Whiskey Trust only fourteen were kept in 
operation and finding that the defendant violated its charter by closing its distillery pursuant 
to trust direction). 
 206. The use of quo warranto proceedings challenging corporate participation in the trusts 
was presaged by cases such as Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 582 (1858).  In 
that case, the court in a detailed analysis declared void a longstanding putative partnership 
between a Massachusetts manufacturing corporation and an individual as outside the powers 
of the corporation, since under partnership law the individual could commit its corporate 
partner but under the corporation’s charter only the officers could bind the corporation. See 
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 207. State v. Am. Cotton Oil Trust, 1 RY. & CORP. L.J. 509 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. 1887) 
(finding a cause of action to exist and allowing it to proceed to trial). 
 208. People v. N. River Sugar Refining Co., 3 N.Y.S. 401 (Cir. Ct. 1889), aff’d, 7 N.Y.S. 
406 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1889), aff’d, 24 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1890) (ordering the forfeiture of a 
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Refining Co., 7 RY. & CORP. L.J. 83 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1890) (ordering forfeiture 
of the franchise). 
 209. State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279 (1892) (ordering the 
severance of the relationship to Standard Oil Trust). 
 210.  Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. at 155 (annulling franchise); see also Distilling & 
Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, 41 N.E. 188 (Ill. 1895). 
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corporation participating in a trust.  North River, a corporation organized 
under New York’s general manufacturing corporation act, was one of 
sixteen companies that signed the original deed of the Sugar Refineries 
Company, which created the Sugar Trust.211  On April 22, 1887, North 
River’s stockholders authorized its secretary to negotiate and sign the 
necessary papers for participating in the Sugar Trust.212  The North River 
secretary signed the trust deed in September, which was dated as of August 
16, 1887, and became effective on October 1, 1887.213  Perhaps having 
second thoughts about the wisdom of involving the corporation formally in 
the creation of the trust, the North River stockholders on November 4, 
1887, passed a resolution denying any authorization to the company officers 
to enter into any agreement with Sugar Refineries and declaring that North 
River was not part of the trust.214  Just three weeks later, however, on 
November 25, the shareholders formally resolved to sell their shares in 
North River for $325,000 to John Searles, who was incidentally the 
treasurer of the Havemeyer Sugar Refining Company (an anchor member of 
the Sugar Trust).215  After Searles became the sole shareholder of North 
River, he conveyed the stock to the trustees of Sugar Refineries in exchange 
for trust certificates with a par value of $700,000, or a little more than 
double the price Searles paid for the stock.216  The Sugar Refineries board 
appointed a new set of directors for North River, which continued in 
operation until its facilities were permanently closed several months later in 
January 1888.217 
In reviewing the New York Attorney General’s petition to revoke the 
North River charter, the New York Court of Appeals first found that North 
River had become a constituent part of the Sugar Trust combination.218  In 
support of their finding, the court noted that the new directors served at the 
sufferance of the trustees, and through the control of the new directors 
Sugar Refineries could cause all North River earnings to be distributed 
through dividends and could mortgage North River properties in order to 
supply funds for the Sugar Refineries to obtain capital to acquire other 
sugar refineries.219  By the direction of the trustees acting through the new 
directors, North River closed its facilities.220  The court dismissed North 
River’s argument that it was a mere bystander and that it continued to 
respond to its shareholders and board of directors, whomever they might 
happen to be.  Not only did North River, through its treasurer, originally 
 
 211. The deed is reprinted in People v. N. River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 585–
95 (1890). 
 212. People v. N. River Sugar Refining Co., 24 N.E. 834, 837 (N.Y. 1890). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 837–38. 
 215. Id. at 838. 
 216. Id.  There is no record of what Searles did with the trust certificates. Id. 
 217. People v. N. River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 599 (N.Y. 1890). 
 218. N. River Sugar, 24 N.E. at 835. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. at 839. 
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sign the trust deed, it acquiesced to participating in the trust, though the 
actions of its original management, by registering the stock transfers, 
seating a new replacement board of Sugar Refineries designees, and paying 
its earning to the new stockholders of record.221 
It remained for the court to determine whether this membership was 
illegal under New York corporation law and, if so, whether this worked to 
the public injury so as to make revocation of its charter an appropriate 
remedy.  The court considered both questions together.222  As a matter of 
state corporation law, North River had abandoned its responsibilities as a 
corporate body to make decisions solely in its own interests.223  Its “real” 
stockholders had been separated from their voting rights given to them by 
the state, its directors served at the sufferance of the Sugar Trust’s board, it 
had no discretion to declare dividends and retain earnings, and its property 
could be mortgaged for interests other than its own.224  At the direction of 
the Trust, North River ceased to do business for the purpose of lessening 
market supply.225  Most egregious to the court, however, was North River’s 
participation in the creation of a trust that circumvented New York’s 
regulations of large the aggregation of capital through the state’s 
corporation laws.226  The court concluded that it was unnecessary to 
determine whether the Sugar Trust was an unlawful combination in restraint 
of trade or monopoly.227  It was enough that North River abandoned its 
corporate responsibilities imposed on it by law, much less that it evaded 
state supervision of capital aggregations by forming an unsupervised trust 
or partnership.228  The court affirmed the judgment of dissolution.229 
Nebraska’s suit to revoke the charter of the Nebraska Distilling Company 
proceeded on a somewhat different theory.230  In 1887, NDC became part of 
the Distillers and Cattle Feeders Trust, better known as the Whiskey 
Trust.231  The stockholders of NDC, whose assets the trust assessed at 
$100,000, exchanged their stock in return for trust certificates valued at par 
at $285,700 (yet another example of stock watering), whereupon NDC 
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 228. Similarly, in its action to declare the American Cotton Oil Trust illegal and enjoin it 
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509, 510–11 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. 1887). 
 229. N. River Sugar, 24 N.E. at 839. 
 230. State v. Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. 155 (Neb. 1890). 
 231. Id. at 156. 
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issued new stock to the trustees, who in turn installed a new board of 
directors for the company.232  The Whiskey Trust, which was started after 
the failure of a series of pools, was formed for the purpose of reducing the 
industry production of alcohol, spirits, and liquor.233  The trust’s method of 
controlling production was simple: it centralized production in the most 
efficient plants and mothballed the rest.234  By 1890, of the roughly 90 to 
110 distilleries located north and west of the Ohio River, 75 to 80 had 
become members of the trust.235  Of these, the trust kept fourteen in 
operation.236 
Within a few months after joining the trust, the NDC plant was closed.237  
The plant stayed shuttered but apparently operational until January 1890.238  
At that time, the NDC’s shareholders (that is, the trustees of the Whiskey 
Trust) voted to liquidate NDC’s plant and equipment and surrender NDC’s 
corporate charter to the state of Nebraska.239  It is likely that the trustees 
were concerned about the possibility of a quo warranto proceeding, which 
could result not only in the revocation of NDC’s charter but also in the 
appointment of a receiver for its assets and possibly the reopening of 
production.  The trustees authorized NDC’s president to convey without 
restriction the plant’s equipment to Weston Arnold, a trust operative, who 
five days later assigned his interest in all but two cookers and a mash pump 
to George Woolsey, one of NDC’s original stockholders and later a trust-
appointed officer of NDC.240  Woolsey, who wished to use the plant for the 
manufacture of cereals, agreed with Arnold not to use any part of the 
equipment for distilling purposes for a period of roughly twenty years and 
to include a restrictive covenant to the same effect for the benefit of Arnold 
in the event Woolsey ever sold the plant to someone else.241  In making 
these assignments, the Whiskey Trust sought to dissolve NDC before a quo 
warranto proceeding could revoke its charter and to ensure that NDC’s 
plant would not resume production.242  In addition, the reservation of the 
two cookers and mash pump by Arnold was designed to destroy the plant’s 
usefulness as a distillery regardless of what Woolsey did with the other 
equipment.243 
The scheme did not work.  Within days after the assignment to Woolsey 
the state initiated its action.244  Although NDC’s charter stated that it was 
organized for the purpose of the manufacture and sale of alcohol, spirits, 
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and other liquors, the court did not cite the NDC’s takeover by the trust or 
the failure of NDC to stay in business as the grounds for revoking the 
charter (probably because the attorney general was really after the 
equipment, which was already out of NDC’s hands, before it could be 
rendered useless for distilling purposes).  Rather, the court noted that the 
general corporation statute under which NDC had been organized restricted 
the operations of Nebraska corporations to those with a lawful purpose; acts 
done in furtherance of an unlawful purpose were unauthorized and in excess 
of the corporation's powers, and therefore illegal and void.  The court found 
that NDC’s purpose in originally joining the Whiskey Trust was to suppress 
competition and create a monopoly, and that all contracts and conveyances 
in furtherance of this purpose—including the conveyance of the equipment 
to Arnold and Woolsey—were null and void.245  Since the equipment was 
within the jurisdiction of the court, the court could take control of it and 
dispose of it as the ends of justice required.  Moreover, NDC’s 
unauthorized contracts and conveyances also provided the grounds for the 
court annulling NDC’s corporate franchise.246 
The quo warranto actions by New York, California, Nebraska, and Ohio 
against their respective state corporations for participating in a trust proper, 
and the action by Louisiana to enjoin the Cotton Oil Trust from operating in 
the state for lack of incorporation, are often regarded as the first antitrust 
actions against the trusts.  While harm to customers and suppliers and the 
tendency to monopoly may have been a consideration in bringing the 
actions, and certainly were noted when the states argued that participation 
in the trusts were not only ultra vires but also against the public interest, 
competition concerns were probably secondary at best.  In the New York 
and Nebraska actions, the quo warranto actions were brought against 
corporations whose facilities were closed down by the controlling trust,247 
while Louisiana directly challenged the operation of the Cotton Oil Trust, 
which had shut down two mills in the state.248  At least in New York and 
perhaps in the other states as well, the closure of a plant and the 
concomitant loss of employment appear to be the determinative factor.  It is 
worth noting that the base of the Sugar Trust was in New York, yet the only 
quo warranto proceeding that the state brought was against a constituent 
corporation whose facilities were closed almost immediately upon joining 
the trust.  For many years, New York left the Sugar Trust unmolested, 
although the Sugar Trust was one of the most notorious combinations in the 
country, controlling 85 percent of the refining capacity on the East Coast, 
and probably the most significant combination operating in New York, 
since it controlled all of the sugar refineries in the state.249  Nor did New 
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 247. See People v. N. River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 599 (1890); see also Neb. 
Distilling Co., 46 N.W. at 157. 
 248. See State v. Am. Cotton Oil Trust, 1 RY. & CORP. L.J. 509, 510 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. 
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 249. NEW YORK 1888 REPORT, supra note 176, at 6. 
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York challenge the participation of its domestic corporations, notably 
including the Standard Oil Company of New York, in other trusts proper.  
Certainly the New York authorities were aware of the operation of a 
number of trusts proper within its jurisdiction.  Not only were these 
reported with some frequency in The New York Times, but a committee of 
the state senate charged with investigating the trusts compiled an extensive 
record and issued reports in 1888 and 1889.250  There were countervailing 
considerations.  As the New York State Senate committee noted, some of 
the major trusts (such as the Standard Oil Trust or the Cotton Oil Trust that 
Louisiana attacked) had their headquarters located in New York City and 
therefore contributed “to the wealth and prosperity of the great commercial 
center of the country.”251 
It is also not clear to what extent the quo warranto proceedings, even if 
successful, would have impeded the operation of the trusts.  When the 
appeal was pending on Louisiana’s challenge to the operation of the Cotton 
Oil Trust, the trust dissolved the constituent Louisiana corporations and 
transferred their assets to a Rhode Island corporation the trust had set up for 
that purpose.252  When the appeal was heard, counsel for the Cotton Oil 
Trust informed the appellate court that since the corporations no longer 
existed the case was moot.253  Likewise, after a writ of quo warranto had 
issued in the trial court against the Nebraska Distilling Company and while 
the case was pending appeal, the Whiskey Trust arranged for the assets of 
the company to be sold to a purchaser who ostensibly would use the 
facilities for a cereal mill and under a sale and purchase agreement that 
contained a restrictive covenant that prohibited the purchaser and any 
successors or assigns from manufacturing spirits at the facility for a number 
of years.254 
In any event, the actions by New York, California, Nebraska, and 
Louisiana—and the prospect of similar actions by other states—caused the 
trusts to look for another legal vehicle.  Some fundamental changes in 
corporation law, especially in New Jersey, caused the major trusts proper 
and other large multistate combinations to look again at incorporation. 
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E.  Holding Corporations and the Liberalization of Incorporation Laws 
As general incorporation statutes became more common and the number 
of general corporations grew, some states began competing with one 
another in the reform of their general corporation laws to attract new 
incorporations, including those sponsored by out-of-state capital, in order to 
increase employment in the states as well as increase the state’s revenues 
from registration and franchise fees and other corporate taxes.255  New 
Jersey was already a leader in the race among states to liberalize 
incorporation laws.256  A major turning point occurred in 1888, when the 
state amended its general incorporation law to permit corporations to hold 
stock and bonds in other corporations chartered under the laws of other 
states.257  Equally important, in 1892 New Jersey explicitly authorized its 
corporations to operate and hold property outside of the state, requiring 
only that they have an office in New Jersey.258  In 1893, another amendment 
cleared up an ambiguity in the earlier law and expressly declared that it was 
lawful for any New Jersey general corporation to purchase, hold, and sell 
the stock or bonds of any other corporation.259  When New Jersey revised 
and restated its general corporation law in 1896, it had eliminated nearly all 
of the remaining common law restrictions on corporate structure and 
activity, including time limits on the duration of corporate charters, 
constraints on the number and scope of permissible lines of business, and 
limitations on capitalization of the issuance of nonvoting shares and shares 
without par value.260  The more relaxed laws also conferred substantial 
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discretion on corporate directors in deciding what information must be 
conveyed to shareholders and in utilizing proxy votes to make basic 
corporate decisions.261  Other states soon followed with their own 
liberalizations, including New York in 1892,262 Connecticut263 and 
Pennsylvania in 1895,264 and Delaware in 1899.265 
Authorization by the incorporating state for its corporations to buy stock 
in other corporations, operate out of state, and hold property in other 
jurisdictions, coupled with the elimination of restrictions on corporate 
duration, lines of business, and capital structures, of course, solved only 
half the problem in providing a corporate vehicle for combinations and 
other large business enterprises.  At least in principle, state legislatures 
could have attempted to limit, if not preclude, foreign corporations from 
doing business within their respective jurisdictions.  States also could have 
continued to use quo warranto proceedings to prohibit their domestic 
corporations from becoming part of a foreign holding corporation just as 
some of them did when their corporations became part of a trust proper.  
But most states moved in just the opposite direction, perhaps because of 
some intervening Supreme Court decisions. 
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Figure 3.  New Jersey Corporation Taxes 
(as a percentage of total New Jersey tax receipts) 
 
In 1876, the Supreme Court began to pull back from its earlier 
suggestions that states could discriminate arbitrarily against foreign 
corporations, or at least discriminate against the sale of goods by foreign 
corporations in the course of interstate commerce.  In Welton v. Missouri,266 
the Court used the Commerce Clause to invalidate a discriminatory 
licensing fee imposed on traveling wholesale salesmen, known as 
“drummers,” representing out-of-state manufacturers but not on those 
representing in-state manufacturers.267  Welton, an agent of the Singer 
Sewing Machine Company who was indicted and convicted for failing to 
obtain the requisite license to sell goods produced out of state, claimed that 
the license fee constituted a tax on the sale of goods in interstate commerce 
and therefore an unconstitutional restraint.268  The Court, despite a history 
of sustaining state taxes on the in-state sales activities of foreign 
corporations, agreed.269  A decade later, in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing 
District,270 the Court held that even nondiscriminatory drummer license 
fees are invalid if they impede interstate commerce.271  While Welton and 
Robbins paved the way for the expansion of firms such as Singer and 
McCormick that used demonstration agents who required no local facilities 
to market their products, Cooley and Paul continued to permit states 
complete freedom to regulate foreign corporations producing out-of-state 
goods or services that required local manufacturing, warehouses, sales, or 
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service facilities.272  These were considered intrastate business operations 
that could be discriminatorily taxed, regulated, or even prohibited.273  In 
1886, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,274 the Court held 
that a corporation was a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, thus beginning the breakdown of the constitutional distinction 
between the mobility of foreign goods and the mobility of foreign 
corporations.275 
In the wake of the liberalization of general incorporation laws, and the 
Supreme Court’s decisions making it more difficult for states to prohibit or 
discriminate against foreign corporations, many large business enterprises, 
especially those organized as trusts proper (and subject to possible future 
quo warranto attacks), quickly reconfigured themselves as corporations.  In 
the few years before the passage of the Sherman Act, these included the 
National Cordage Company (1887), the American Tobacco Company 
(1890), the Diamond Match Company (1890), the Distilling and Cattle 
Feeding Company (1890) (reorganized in 1895 into the American Spirits 
Manufacturing Company), and the National Starch Manufacturing 
Company (1890).276  Perhaps because of a fear that some states would view 
a domestic corporation’s participation as a subsidiary to a holding company 
the same way as they viewed participation in a trust proper, almost all 
reorganizing trusts originally consolidated their constituent companies 
through merger or purchase into a single corporation and eschewed the 
holding company form.  Typically, the trust would organize a new 
corporation, which would then purchase the plant and equipment of its 
members at an agreed-upon value (often very inflated) in exchange for the 
corporation’s stock of equal par value.  In addition, the seller would agree 
not to reenter the business, usually for a considerable length of time, and 
would often execute a considerable bond to secure the obligation. 
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(1888) (upholding a discriminatory tax on in-state offices of foreign corporations); Cooper 
Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727 (1885). 
 274. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 275. See Morton J. Horowitz, Santa Clara Revisited:  The Development of Corporate 
Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 173 (1985). 
 276. See ELIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (1921).  Within a 
few years after the passage of the Sherman Act, other significant enterprises, including the 
American Sugar Refining Company (1891), the National Lead Company (1891), the General 
Electric Company (1892), the United States Rubber Company (1892), the National Wall 
Paper Company (1892), the United States Leather Company (1893), and the American 
Malting Company (1897), reorganized into corporations. Id.; GLENN D. BABCOCK, HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES RUBBER COMPANY (1966); ARTHUR STONE DEWING, CORPORATE 
PROMOTIONS AND REORGANIZATIONS 19–20 (1914) (formation of the United States Leather 
Company); CLIFFORD DYER HOLLEY, THE LEAD AND ZINC PIGMENTS 24–25 (1909) 
(formation of the National Lead Company); MOODY, supra note 182, at 248 (formation of 
the General Electric Company). 
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The reorganization of the Match Trust into a single corporation provides 
a good example.277  The promoters of the Match Trust organized the 
Diamond Match Company under the laws of Connecticut on December 3, 
1880.278  The capital stock of the company consisted of $2,225,000, divided 
into $1,400,000 of common stock and $850,000 of preferred stock.279  
Members transferred their real estate, plants, machinery, patents, and good-
will to the Diamond Match Company at agreed-upon valuations in 
exchange for common stock of equal par value.280  Each proprietor also 
would transfer its matches and match materials to Diamond in exchange for 
preferred stock or, if the par value of the preferred stock was insufficient, 
preferred stock and cash.281  Selling companies also agreed not to reenter 
the business of manufacturing friction matches for a period of years and 
executed bonds that provided for payment of liquidated damages to 
Diamond in the event of a breach.282  Controlling shareholders of corporate 
sellers were also required to enter into similar noncompetition agreements 
in their individual capacities and execute bonds.283  Finally, presumably to 
provide Diamond with some operating capital, sellers were required to 
purchase for cash at par value one-half as much preferred stock as they 
received in common stock for its property.284  The Richardson Match 
Company, a Detroit concern, for example, sold its plant and equipment to 
Diamond for $190,000 in common stock and subscribed for preferred stock 
in the amount of $95,000.285  The company entered into a twenty-year 
noncompetition covenant and executed a $50,000 bond, while David 
Richardson, the majority shareholder and general manager, also signed a 
twenty-year noncompetition agreement and executed a $25,000 bond.286  In 
this manner, Diamond was able to purchase the plant and equipment of 
thirty-one manufacturers, comprising essentially all of the friction match 
manufacturing facilities in the United States, of which all but thirteen were 
quickly closed.287 
Of the ten largest corporate consolidations chartered between 1887 and 
1897, only the American Cotton Oil Company (1889) organized itself 
originally as a holding company.288  The Standard Oil Trust, perhaps gun-
shy from its defeat in the Ohio courts and wary of the legality of 
transforming a trust proper into a holding company, operated under the 
 
 277. See Richardson v. Buhl, 43 N.W. 1102 (Mich. 1889). 
 278. Id. at 1111. 
 279. Id. at 1103. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 1104. 
 286. Id. at 1103. 
 287. Id. at 1111.  For a discussion of the reorganization of the National Lead Trust into 
the National Lead Company, see Nat’l Lead Co. v. S.E. Grote Paint Store Co., 80 Mo. App. 
247 (Ct. App. 1899). 
 288. JONES, supra note 276, at 40. 
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control of its nine principal shareholders acting in their individual capacities 
until 1899, when it finally overcame its reluctance and reorganized as a 
New Jersey holding company.289  By 1899, all of the trusts that had been 
attacked by state quo warranto prosecutions had reorganized themselves as 
corporations,290 while some 280 other combinations with capitalizations 
exceeding $10 million had incorporated in New Jersey by 1894.291 
IV.  THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
As the 1880s progressed, there was growing political pressure to do 
something about the dramatic social dislocations, the perceived suppression 
of individual opportunity, and the shifts in income distribution that 
accompanied the rapid industrialization of the decade.  The call for action 
against the trusts was part of this movement.  Trusts, in the mind of the 
public and most contemporary commentators, were combinations of 
competitors, regardless of their technical legal form, that sought to increase 
prices and regulate production levels, although there was also concern, 
especially in the agricultural states, that trusts also suppressed the prices 
they paid for raw materials and other inputs.292  A report by a New York 
State Senate committee charged with investigating the operation of the 
trusts within the state observed: 
[T]he main purpose, management and effect of all upon the public is the 
same, to wit:  The aggregation of capital, the power of controlling the 
manufacture and output of various necessary commodities; the acquisition 
or destruction of competitive properties, all leading to the final and 
conclusive purposes of annihilating competition and enabling the 
industries represented in the combination to fix the price at which they 
would purchase the raw material from the producer, and at which they 
would sell the refined product to the consumer.293 
U.S. Senator David Turpie expressed a similar view to Congress: 
[A] trust, in the most recent acceptation of the term, is a union or 
combination, rarely of individuals, usually of corporations, dealing in or 
producing a certain commodity, of the total amount of which belonging to 
them a common stock is made with the intention of holding and selling 
 
 289. See MOODY, supra note 182, at 125. 
 290. 19 U.S. INDUS. COMM’N, supra note 54, at 598–99. 
 291. See GEORGE H. EVANS, JR., BUSINESS INCORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1800–
1943, at 126–31 (1948). 
 292. See, e.g., Chi., Wilmington & Vermillion Coal Co. v. People, 114 Ill. App. 75, 112 
(App. Ct. 1904) (“A pool or trust is a combination having the intention and power, or 
tendency, to monopolize business, or to control production, or to interfere with trade, or to 
fix and regulate prices, and the like.  The primary object of a pool or trust is to secure a 
monopoly, since from that point of advantage it can destroy its competitors, and can control 
production, sales and prices.”); CHARLES FISK BEACH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
MONOPOLIES AND INDUSTRIAL TRUSTS 4 (1898) (“[The term ‘trust’] is used to designate any 
corporation, association or other combination, the object of which is to create a monopoly, 
either complete or partial, with a view to increasing prices by suppressing competition and 
obtaining control of the market.”). 
 293. NEW YORK 1888 REPORT, supra note 176, at 5. 
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the same at an enhanced price, by suppressing or limiting the supply and 
by other devices, so that the price of such trust commodity shall depend 
merely upon the agreement made about it by those in the combination, 
without reference to the cost of its production, the quantity of the article 
held for consumption, or the demand therefor among buyers.294 
Many citizens, encouraged by an increasing number of newspaper articles 
and other reports in the popular literature, focused their discontent on the 
large combinations that directly or indirectly touched almost everyone, 
whether as a customer, employee, supplier, or competitor.295  At the same 
time, there was a general recognition that the country had evolved beyond 
the agrarian economy of the pre–Civil War days; that technological, 
transportation, and managerial developments had enormously increased the 
nation’s productivity by creating large economies of scale and scope; that 
large, highly capitalized businesses were a necessary consequence; and that 
there would be no returning to an era when only small businesses existed.  
As a result, the difference between combinations of independent firms and 
large unitary business enterprises that had grown organically became 
critical. 
A.  State Antitrust Legislation 
The states reacted first to the calls for antitrust legislation.  By and large, 
states are more homogeneous than the country as a whole, and it was 
natural that the citizens of some states would be disproportionately 
adversely affected by perceived trust activities.  Moreover, this same 
relative homogeneity made it easier for the affected citizens in these states 
to obtain protective legislation from their state legislatures.  Finally, in the 
1880s, states were the regulators of first instance of microeconomic 
activities.  Consistent with the prevailing notions of federalism, the 
responsibility for regulating economic activities and preserving competition 
originally fell to the individual states.  Prior to the passage of the Sherman 
Act in 1890, thirteen states had enacted their own antitrust law:  Iowa 
(1888), Kansas (1889), Maine (1889), North Carolina (1889), Nebraska 
(1889), Texas (1889), Tennessee (1889), Missouri (1889), Michigan (1889), 
Mississippi (1890), North Dakota (1890), South Dakota (1890), and 
Kentucky (1890). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 294. 21 CONG. REC. 137 (1889) (remarks of Sen. David Turpie).  
 295. One admittedly incomplete survey identified fifteen treatises or reports of official 
investigations and over thirty-five articles addressing the trust issue written between 1887 
and 1890. Charles J. Bullock, Trust Literature:  A Survey and a Criticism, 15 Q.J. ECON. 
167, 168 (1901). 
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Table 3:  State and Federal Antitrust Legislation to the Sherman Act 
As discussed, state courts in the United States applied the common law to 
find void and unenforceable the agreements underlying combinations of 
competitors organized for the purpose of raising prices and limiting 
production.  Although some of the fine points vary, each of the thirteen 
state antitrust statutes contains a broad prohibition against combinations 
designed to raise price or reduce production.  Although some courts raised 
the possibility that combinations could regulate prices and output to the 
extent necessary to control excessive competition, I could find no reported 
court decisions that enforced a combination implementing agreements on 
this ground.  North Carolina, however, appears to have recognized this 
defense by prohibiting only price increases “beyond the price that would be 
fixed by the natural demand for or the supply of” the products in 
question.296  Six state statutes—Kansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
Mississippi, Texas, and South Dakota—explicitly prohibited collective 
activity to reduce prices (presumably of inputs),297 although many statutes 
had catch-all provisions prohibiting the restriction of “full and free 
competition” or something to a similar effect that might be used to reach 
collective monopsony pricing.298  The North Carolina and Tennessee 
 
 296. Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 374, § 2, 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws 372, 373. 
 297. Act of Mar. 9, 1889, ch. 257, § 1, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389; Act of February 22, 
1890, ch. 36, § 1, 1890 Miss. Laws 55; Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 374, § 2; Act of Mar. 7, 
1890, ch. 154, § 1, 1890 S.D. Sess. Laws 323 (farm and agricultural products); Act of Apr. 6, 
1889, ch. 250, § 1, 1889 Tenn. Acts 475; Act of Mar. 30, 1889, ch. 117, § 1, 1889 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 141. 
 298. Act of Mar. 9, 1889, ch. 257, § 1 (“full and free competition”); Act of July 1, 1889, 
no. 225, § 1, 1889 Mich. Pub. Acts 331 (“free competition”); Act of Feb. 22, 1890, ch. 36, 
§ 1, 1890 Miss. Laws 55 (“free and unrestricted competition”); Act of Mar. 7, 1890, ch. 154, 
Iowa Act of April 16, 1888, ch. 84, 1888 Iowa Acts 124 
Maine Act of March 7, 1889, ch. 266, 1889 Me. Laws 235 
Kansas Act of March 9, 1889, ch. 257, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389  
North Carolina Act of March 11, 1889, ch. 374, 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws 372 
Nebraska Act of March 29, 1889, ch. 69, 1889 Neb. Laws 516 
Texas Act of March 30, 1889, ch. 117, 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 141  
Tennessee Act of April 6, 1889, ch. 250, 1889 Tenn. Acts 475 
Missouri Act of May 18, 1889, 1889 Mo. Laws 96 
Michigan Act of July 1, 1889, no. 225, 1889 Mich. Pub. Acts 331 
Mississippi Act of February 22, 1890, ch. 36, 1890 Miss. Laws 55 
North Dakota Act of March 3, 1890, ch. 174, 1890 N.D. Laws 503 
South Dakota Act of March 7, 1890, ch. 154, 1890 S.D. Sess. Laws 323  
Kentucky Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, 1890 Ky. Acts 143 
Federal Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 674, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)  
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statutes also contained early predatory pricing provisions, with North 
Carolina prohibiting pricing “for less than actual cost for the purpose of 
breaking down competitors”299 and Tennessee prohibiting dumping 
products on the market to create an “undue depression in the price of such 
article, and by such means to destroy or limit legitimate competition.”300 
In addition to codifying the basic common law prohibitions against 
combinations in restraint of trade, five states—Kansas, Maine, Missouri, 
North Dakota, and Kentucky—prohibited corporations and other persons 
from forming or participating in a trust (broadly defined, usually as a 
combination to fix prices or reduce production), issuing trust certificates, or 
placing the management or control of their companies in the hands of 
trustees.301  Maine and Missouri also required their respective secretaries of 
state to send a letter of inquiry to each corporation organized under the laws 
of the state to ascertain whether the corporation is a member of a trust or 
other prohibited combination and required a senior officer to respond under 
oath or else the corporate charter would be revoked.302  In 1892, however, 
the Missouri Supreme Court declared the provision unconstitutional under 
the Missouri Constitution, since the Missouri antitrust statute subjected 
officers and directors of a violating corporation to criminal sanctions.303  
Maine did not subject officers and directors of a violating corporation to 
criminal penalties. 
As noted earlier, the common law made contracts and combinations in 
restraint of trade void and unenforceable as a matter of contract law, but 
they were not criminal offenses that the state could challenge or torts for 
which an injured party could seek redress.  All thirteen of the state statutes 
made violations criminal offenses.  The penalties varied widely, both across 
and within states.  Nine states provided for incarceration.  On the low end, 
Kansas and Nebraska provided for a maximum term of six months,304 while 
Missouri, North Dakota, and Kentucky had maximum terms of one year.305  
South Dakota provided for a maximum term of 3 years.306  North Carolina, 
 
§ 1 (“free, fair and full competition”); Act of Mar. 30, 1889, ch. 117, § 1 (“free and 
unrestricted competition”). 
 299. Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 374, § 5. 
 300. Act of Apr. 6, 1889, ch. 250, § 1. 
 301. Act of Mar. 9, 1889, ch. 257, § 2; Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, § 2, 1890 Ky. Acts 
143; Act of Mar. 7, 1889, ch. 266, § 1, 1889 Me. Laws 235; Act of May 18, 1889, § 2, 1889 
Mo. Laws 96; Act of Mar. 3, 1890, ch. 174, § 2, 1890 N.D. Laws 503, 504; see also Act of 
Feb. 22, 1890, ch. 36, § 1 (defining combinations as trusts but not explicitly the issuance of 
trust certificates or the subordination to trust management); Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 374, 
§ 3 (same); Act of Mar. 30, 1889, ch. 117, § 1 (same). 
 302. Act of Mar. 7, 1889, ch. 266, § 4; Act of May 18, 1889, § 6. 
 303. See State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Simmons Hardware Co., 18 S.W. 1125, 1127 (Mo. 
1892).  The experience under the statute is recounted in Steven L. Piott, Missouri and 
Monopoly? The 1890s As an Experiment in Law Enforcement, 74 MO. HIST. REV. 21 (1979). 
 304. Act of Mar. 9, 1889, ch. 257, § 3; Act of Mar. 29, 1889, ch. 69, § 6, 1889 Neb. Laws 
516, 519. 
 305. Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, § 3; Act of May 18, 1889, § 3; Act of Mar. 3, 1890, 
ch. 174, § 3. 
 306. Act of Mar. 7, 1890, ch. 154, § 1, 1890 S.D. Sess. Laws 323. 
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Texas, and Mississippi each provided for a maximum term of ten years.307  
Iowa, Maine, and Tennessee did not provide for imprisonment. 
On criminal fines, Michigan and Tennessee appear on the low end.  
Depending on the section violated, Michigan provided for a criminal fine 
range of $50 to $300 or $500 and imprisonment of not more than six 
months to one year.308  Tennessee provided for a criminal fine of not less 
than $250 for the first offense and not less than $500 for subsequent 
offenses, together in both cases with a $50 tax to be paid to the state 
attorney general as costs.309  Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota provided 
for a maximum criminal fine of $1,000.310  Iowa, Texas, Missouri 
(individual only), Mississippi, North Dakota (individual only), and 
Kentucky provided a maximum fine of $5,000,311 while Maine 
(organizational only) and North Carolina had maximum fines of $10,000.312  
In addition, Missouri and North Dakota provided for organizational fines of 
between 1 percent and 20 percent of the corporation’s capital stock or the 
amount invested otherwise.313  Interestingly, in addition to a criminal fine, 
Mississippi also provided for a forfeiture of $50 for each day of a violation 
to be paid into the state treasury to the credit of the common school fund.314 
Nebraska, Texas, Tennessee, Michigan, Mississippi, North Dakota, and 
Kentucky all provided for the revocation of the charter through a quo 
warranto proceeding of any domestic corporation that violated their 
antitrust laws,315 although the other states undoubtedly had this option 
under their respective corporation laws. 
Most states simply ordered their respective attorney general and 
subordinate state attorneys to enforce the law.  Some states, however, 
clearly were concerned about incentives to enforce the law.  Missouri 
incentivized its attorney general and prosecuting attorneys by entitling them 
to one-fifth of any fine collected if prosecuting alone or one-fourth if 
prosecuting together.316  Similarly, Tennessee provided that the attorney 
general would receive 50 percent of any fine as well as a taxed fee of 
 
 307. Act of Feb. 22, 1890, ch. 36, § 2, 1890 Miss. Laws 55, 56; Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 
374, § 3; Act of Mar. 30, 1889, ch. 117, § 6, 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 141, 142. 
 308. Act of July 1, 1889, no. 225, §§ 1, 3, 1889 Mich. Pub. Acts 331, 332. 
 309. Act of Apr. 6, 1889, ch. 250, § 2, 1889 Tenn. Acts 475. 
 310. Act of Mar. 9, 1889, ch. 257, § 3, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389, 390; Act of Mar. 29, 
1889, ch. 69, § 6, 1889 Neb. Laws 516, 519; Act of Mar. 7, 1890, ch. 154, § 1. 
 311. Act of Apr. 16, 1888, ch. 84, § 2, 1888 Iowa Acts 124; Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 
1621, § 3, 1890 Ky. Acts 143, 144; Act of Feb. 22, 1890, ch. 36, § 2; Act of May 18, 1889, 
§ 3; Act of Mar. 3, 1890, ch. 174, § 3, 1890 N.D. Laws 503, 504; Act of Mar. 30, 1889, 
ch. 117, § 6. 
 312. Act of Mar. 7, 1889, ch. 266, § 3, 1889 Me. Laws 235, 236; Act of Mar. 11, 1889, 
ch. 374, § 3. 
 313. Act of May 18, 1889, § 3; Act of Mar. 3, 1890, ch. 174, § 3. 
 314. Act of Feb. 22, 1890, ch. 36, § 7, 1890 Miss. Laws 55, 57. 
 315. Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, § 5; Act of July 1, 1889, no. 225, § 5, 1889 Mich. 
Pub. Acts 331, 333; Act of Feb. 22, 1890, ch. 36, § 10; Act of Mar. 29, 1889, ch. 69, § 5; Act 
of Mar. 3, 1890, ch. 174, §§ 6–7; Act of Apr. 6, 1889, ch. 250, § 4, 1889 Tenn. Acts 475, 
476; Act of Mar. 30, 1889, ch. 117, § 3. 
 316. Act of May 18, 1889, § 8. 
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$50.317  Kansas provided that county attorneys that fail to prosecute and 
officials with knowledge of a violation who fail to come forward and notify 
the county attorney were subject to fines between $100 and $500 and 
forfeiture of office.318 
Surprisingly, only Nebraska and Kansas provided for a private right of 
action by persons injured as a result of a violation of the state’s antitrust 
law.  Nebraska provided for the recovery of the “full amount of damages 
sustained” plus a reasonable attorney’s fee.319  Kansas provided for a 
private right of action to recover the full purchase price paid by the plaintiff 
to any illegal combination.320  Missouri and Kentucky provided that a 
purchaser from an illegal combination was not liable for the purchase price 
and could interpose the illegality of the combination as a defense in a 
failure to pay contract action but it does not explicitly provide for a private 
right of action to recover a purchase price that had already been paid.321  
South Dakota permitted “any person” to file a complaint for any violation 
of its antitrust law and instructed its courts to proceed with the case “the 
same as though the State’s Attorney had made the complaint.”322  The 
language of the statute is ambiguous as to whether it applied to criminal 
complaints as well as petitions for injunctive relief. 
B.  Federal Antitrust Legislation 
As enacted, the Sherman Act was signed by President Harrison on July 2, 
1890.323  A statute was necessary if the federal government was to address 
the problem of combinations, since federal courts have no criminal 
jurisdiction over common law crimes.324 
The Sherman Act took a somewhat different tack than the state antitrust 
statutes.  Rather than specifically targeting trusts and other combinations, 
the Sherman Act adopted the language of the common law.  Section 1 
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations,”325 while section 2 makes it unlawful to “monopolize, 
 
 317. Act of Apr. 6, 1889, ch. 250, § 2. 
 318. Act of Mar. 9, 1889, ch. 257, §§ 7–8, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389, 390–91. 
 319. Act of Mar. 29, 1889, ch. 69, § 3. 
 320. Act of Mar. 9, 1889, ch. 257, § 4. 
 321. Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, § 4, 1890 Ky. Acts 143, 144; Act of May 18, 1889, 
§ 4. 
 322. Act of Mar. 7, 1890, ch. 154, § 4, 1890 S.D. Sess. Laws 323, 325. 
 323. Act of July 2, 1890 (Sherman Act), ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).  The act was 
officially designated the Sherman Act by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 305(a), 90 Stat. 1397. 
 324. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see 
also United States v. Britton, 108 U.S. 199, 206 (1883); United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. 
(1 Wheat.) 415, 416 (1816); In re Greene, 52 F. 104, 111 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892).  For a 
modern affirmation of this rule, see United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988).  
 325. Sherman Act § 1.  
 2340 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce.”326 
The appeal of the common law to the framers of the Sherman Act resided 
in both the particular restrictions that the common law imposed at the time 
but also the fact that the law could be adjusted by the courts using the 
common law process continuously through time to cope with new, 
emerging business practices.  Senator Sherman, commenting on an earlier 
version of the bill, explicitly noted that the language was intended to 
provide the federal courts a body of law from which it could draw in 
making decisions: 
This bill, as I would have it, has for its single object to invoke the aid of 
the courts of the United States to . . . supplement the enforcement of the 
established rules of the common and statute law by the courts of the 
several States in dealing with combinations that affect injuriously the 
industrial liberty of the citizens of these States.327 
To this end, Senator Shearman also argued that the bill “does not announce 
a new principle of law, but applies old and well-recognized principles of the 
common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal 
Government.”328  On numerous occasions, backers of the Sherman Act 
assured the floor of the Senate that they were merely seeking to enable 
federal courts to apply the common law to anticompetitive business 
activities329 and early federal cases are full of citations to English and state 
common law.330  But equally important, the Sherman Act’s use of common 
law terminology empowered the federal courts to use a common law 
approach to continue to develop and refine antitrust law as the courts gained 
familiarity with various business practices and their consequences, as 
business practices continued to evolve and economics learning developed. 
As did the state antitrust statutes, the Sherman Act made violations 
criminal offenses.  The original act made violations misdemeanors 
punishable by a fine not to exceed $5,000,331 about the middle of the range 
provided by the state statutes.  The Sherman Act also provided for 
 
 326. Id. § 2.  Section 3 essentially applies the prohibitions of section 1 to commerce 
within or with any territory or the District of Columbia. Id. § 3.  Interestingly, there is no 
counterpart to section 2 for territories or the District of Columbia. 
 327. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). 
 328. Id. at 2456. 
 329. See, e.g., id. at 2456, 2457, 2561, 2563 (statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at 3146, 
3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar). 
 330. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278–91 (6th Cir. 
1989), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (comprehensively surveying common law cases as a 
means of construing the Sherman Act); In re Greene, 52 F. 104, 111 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892) 
(noting that the Sherman Act “does not undertake to define what constitutes a contract, 
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, and recourse must therefore be had to the 
common law for the proper definition of these general terms”); In re Corning, 51 F. 205, 210 
(N.D. Ohio 1892) (“These terms, as used in the act of congress under consideration, are well 
defined at common law, and must be considered with reference to such established 
meaning.”). 
 331. Sherman Act §§ 1–2. 
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imprisonment not exceeding one year, on the lower end of the state 
imprisonment statutes.332  The criminal provisions of the Sherman Act were 
enforceable by the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. district attorneys.333 
The Sherman Act also provided the federal circuit courts with 
jurisdiction in equity to prevent and restrain violations of the Act and 
authorized the Attorney General and the district attorneys to bring 
proceedings to enjoin on-going and imminent violations.334  Moreover, the 
Sherman Act provided the United States with a remedy of forfeiture, so that 
property owned under any illegal contract or by any illegal combination that 
was in the course of being transported in interstate or foreign commerce 
could be condemned and forfeited to the United States.335 
Finally, and unlike the state antitrust statutes, the Sherman Act provides 
persons injured by an antitrust violation in their business or property with a 
private right of action to recover treble damages (three times actual 
damages) plus reasonable attorney’s fees.336  The legislative history of the 
treble damage remedy is sparse, although it appears that the remedy was to 
be available not only to customers who purchased goods or services from a 
combination member at fixed prices but also to competitors who may have 
been driven out of business by a combination’s efforts to control the 
market.337  On multiple damages, the legislative path was convoluted.  
Sherman originally introduced a bill providing that customer could sue for 
double the amount of actual damages resulting from increased prices 
charged pursuant to an illegal combination.338  When the bill was reported 
by the Senate Finance Committee, which Sherman chaired, the bill had 
been amended to provide, as did the Nebraska and Kansas antitrust statutes, 
that purchasers could recover the full consideration paid for any goods or 
merchandise purchased from a combination member at an increased 
 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. § 4. 
 334. Id. The United States circuit courts were established by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73.  The U.S. circuit courts had original jurisdiction over civil actions 
based on diversity jurisdiction and over most federal crimes and appellate jurisdiction over 
U.S. district courts. Id. §§ 11, 22.  The Judiciary Act of 1891 transferred appellate 
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U.S. courts of appeals. ch. 517, §§ 2, 4, 26 Stat. 826.  In 1912, the Judicial Code of 1911 
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district courts. Pub. L. No. 61-475, §§ 289–292, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167. 
 335. Sherman Act § 6.  The United States has only rarely sought forfeiture and then 
mostly in consent decrees rather than litigated relief. See, e.g., United States v. Steinhardt 
Mgmt. Co., No. 94 Civ 9044, 1995 WL 322772 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 1995) (consent decree); 
United States v. Certain Property Owned by Salomon Bros., No. 92 Civ. 3700, 1992 WL 
295221 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1992) (consent decree providing for a $27.5 million asset 
forfeiture to settle in part a charge that Salomon Bros. cornered the market for certain two-
year Treasury notes); see also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 301 
(6th Cir. 1898) (denying as a matter of law a petition in equity for forfeiture and holding that 
forfeiture actions must be tried at law before a jury), aff’d on other grounds, 175 U.S. 211 
(1899). 
 336. Sherman Act § 7. 
 337. See 21 CONG. REC. 2569 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). 
 338. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (as introduced, Aug. 14, 1888). 
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price.339  The full Senate amended the bill, retaining the committee’s 
purchaser cause of action to recover the full consideration and adding a new 
cause of action for actual damages for firms that were compelled to join or 
sell out to a combination or were forced out of business.340  When the 50th 
Congress ended without further action on the bill and the 51st Congress 
convened, Sherman reintroduced the bill as reported earlier by the Senate 
Finance Committee, retaining the purchaser cause of action for the full 
purchase price but eliminating the competitor cause of action that the full 
Senate had introduced.341  When the Finance Committee reported the bill, it 
returned to Sherman’s original idea of double damages, but the language of 
the amendment appeared to broaden the private action to include all injured 
persons and not just purchasers.342  After being reported to, and debated and 
amended by, the Senate,343 double damages and the broadened cause of 
action remained in the bill through the floor debate.  Unexpectedly, and 
undoubtedly to Sherman’s dismay, the bill was referred to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, which rewrote the bill in its entirety in six days.  The 
Judiciary Committee increased the recovery to treble damages,344 where it 
remained through enactment.  No doubt the multiple damages were 
provided not only to compensate victims, but also as an inducement to bring 
what were likely to be expensive and risky law suits,345 as well as a further 
deterrent to committing violations in the first instance.346  Even so, both 
critics and supporters voiced skepticism that, given the difficulties and 
expense of proving a violation, especially against a well-financed 
adversary, there would be much private enforcement of the Sherman Act.347 
V.  SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The state and federal antitrust statutes passed between 1888 and 1890 
were enacted to deal with the increasing number of horizontal 
combinations—what would be called price-fixing cartels today—that had 
emerged throughout the economy in the 1870s and 1880s.  In the course of 
an enormous economic expansion, broadening geographic markets, 
intensifying competition, and falling prices, it had become commonplace 
 
 339. S. 3445, 50th Cong. § 2 (as reported by the S. Comm. on Finance, Sept. 11, 1888). 
 340. S. 3445, 50th Cong. § 3 (as amended by the Senate, Jan. 25, 1889); see 20 CONG. 
REC. 1167 (1889) (motion by Sen. Hoar to add competitor cause of action). 
 341. S. 1, 51st Cong. § 2 (as introduced, Dec. 4, 1889). 
 342. S. 1, 51st Cong. § 2 (as reported by the S. Comm. on Finance, Jan. 14, 1890); see 
21 CONG. REC. 1767–68 (1890) (statement of Sen. George). 
 343. See S. 1, 51st Cong. § 2 (as amended by the Senate, Mar. 26, 1889) (retaining double 
damages). 
 344. S. 1, 51st Cong. § 7 (as reported by the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 1890). 
 345. See 21 CONG. REC. 2569 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (expressing concern 
that even double damages is “too small” to induce private enforcement).  
 346. See 21 CONG. REC. 3146–47 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar) (characterizing treble 
damages as a “penalty”). 
 347. See 21 CONG. REC. 1768 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George) (“I do not hesitate to say 
that few, if any, of such suits will ever be instituted and not one will ever be successful.”); id. 
at 2569 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at 2615 (1890) (statement of Sen. Coke). 
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for competitors to band together in an effort to control production and halt 
the decline in the prices that they charged for their products, if not to 
increase prices to supracompetitive levels.  These efforts were widespread, 
ranging from local grain dealers trying to control the market in a city or a 
town to nationwide combinations trying to control prices across the nation 
for such necessities as oil, sugar, or spirits.  Although much less frequent, in 
other sectors, combinations arose in an effort to exercise monopsony power 
and lower the prices that combination members paid for their production 
inputs.  
The early antitrust statutes were narrowly focused.  Although the 
language of the individual statutes varied considerably, the primary import 
of each of these laws was to adopt the substantive prohibitions in the 
common law against combinations in restraint of trade, extend the 
application of the prohibitions beyond simple combinations and pools to 
include trusts proper and holding companies, and criminalize violations in 
order to enable government enforcement.  
Notably, none of the statutes expanded their substantive prohibitions to 
make combinations unlawful under the statute that would have been lawful 
under the common law.  Although some states did use the legislation to 
codify the state’s ability to use a quo warranto proceeding to revoke a 
domestic corporation’s corporate charter for participating in a trust proper, 
each state also surely had that right without further statutory authorization.  
Nor did the statutes address conduct other than combinations.  
Anticompetitive exclusive and reciprocal dealing, tying arrangements, 
group boycotts, resale price maintenance, non-price vertical restraints, and 
mergers outside of the context of price-fixing combinations were not within 
the ambit of the original antitrust laws at the time they were passed, 
although they later became unlawful under the Sherman Act as the law 
evolved under the common law approach enabled by the statute. 
The extension of the now-statutory prohibitions to trusts proper and 
holding companies was unremarkable.  The common law held that simple 
combinations of independent competitors that were intended and had the 
ability to control prices in the marketplace to the injury of customers (or 
suppliers) were unlawful—at least in the sense of being void and 
unenforceable—and there was no reason to believe that the common law 
would not extend its prohibitions in the normal course to reach 
combinations organized more tightly in trusts proper, corporations, and 
holding companies.  Indeed, the legality of combinations of these types 
under the common law was challenged in several pre-1890 quo warranto 
proceedings.  
The criminalization of what before were simply unenforceable horizontal 
price-fixing arrangements is much more noteworthy.  Prior to the passage 
of the original antitrust laws, combinations in restraint of trade were neither 
criminal nor tortious, and so could operate without fear of challenge by the 
state (apart from quo warranto actions).  Notwithstanding the prospect that 
a combination could harm the community by raising price, reducing output, 
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and inflicting other “evils of monopoly,” the only recourse under the law 
was to hope that the combination fell apart because enough of its members 
cheated on the combination’s rules.  The new antitrust legislation changed 
this.  State and federal prosecutors now had the ability to challenge 
combinations directly. 
Curiously, however, only two states and the federal government passed 
statutes that provided injured private parties—a customer, for example, that 
purchased products or services from a combination member at a 
supracompetitively fixed price or a competitor that was excluded from the 
marketplace by a combination’s exclusive dealing restraints—with a private 
cause of action against the combination.  One would think that more states 
would have concluded that private parties were entitled to redress and 
vindication for their injuries or even that private parties could deter 
violations and advance the public interest by adding another means of 
enforcing the law to supplement limited state enforcement resources.  It 
remains a mystery why more states did not create a private cause of action, 
although certainly one possibility is that the states saw some combinations 
as furthering the state’s economic interest and so wanted to maintain 
exclusivity over which combinations would be challenged under state law. 
In any event, early enforcement of the antitrust statutes was sparse at 
best.  In the electronic case databases, only a handful of cases appear 
through the end of 1893 under the various state statutes and the Sherman 
Act.  Nor does there appear to be any significant number of material 
unreported cases, since there is little mention of additional cases in the 
treatises or the newspapers of the day.  What reported decisions there are, 
however, all pertain to the legality of horizontal combinations. 
The electronic case databases contain only four cases under the thirteen 
state antitrust laws, all brought by the state.  The most interesting of these is 
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Simmons Hardware Co.348  The Missouri 
attorney general brought an action against the Simmons Hardware 
Company alleging (1) that Simmons was a member of a trust organized 
with other corporations to regulate the price of hardware in violation of the 
Missouri antitrust law and (2) that the Simmons managing officers failed to 
respond to the letter of inquiry sent by the secretary of state under the state 
antitrust law to confirm that the company was not a member of an illegal 
trust.349  On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court declared the letter of 
inquiry provisions of the Missouri antitrust statute unconstitutional as 
compelling self-incrimination, since as the law was structured an 
affirmative response would subject the responding officers (as well as the 
corporation) to criminal penalties, a negative response would subject them 
to prosecution for perjury, and a failure to respond would result in the 
immediate revocation of the corporation’s charter.350  The remaining cases 
 
 348. 18 S.W. 1125 (Mo. 1892). 
 349. Id. at 1125. 
 350. Id. at 1127. After the lower court found the law unconstitutional but before the 
Missouri Supreme Court had acted, the Missouri legislature amended the statute to eliminate 
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involved two decisions in Kansas holding that the selling of insurance was 
“trade” and so covered by the Kansas antitrust statute,351 and a decision in 
Texas holding that insurance is not “commence” and therefore not covered 
by the Texas antitrust act.352   
The records of federal prosecutions are more complete.353  Only seven 
cases—four bills in equity and three criminal cases—were brought by the 
United States during the two and a half years that President Harrison 
remained in office after the passage of the Sherman Act.354  All seven cases 
were brought by U.S. district attorneys in the field with only mild 
encouragement from William H.H. Miller, Harrison’s Attorney General.  
Even so, some of the targets were substantial: the Sugar Trust,355 the 
Whiskey Trust,356 the Cash Register Trust,357 a major railroad trust in the 
Midwest,358 and a large lumber trust in the Northwest.359  The government 
also obtained a temporary injunction against the labor unions and union 
 
the prospect of criminal indictments, reallocate the power to revoke the charters of violating 
corporations from the secretary of state to a court of competent jurisdiction, and require 
affirmative proof in court of a state antitrust violation. Act of Apr. 2, 1891, 1891 Mo. Laws 
186 (Apr. 2, 1891) (repealing chapter 128).  The law was revised once again in 1885. Act of 
Apr. 11, 1895, 1895 Mo. Laws 237.  For the early saga of the Missouri antitrust law, see 
Piott, supra note 303, at 21. 
 351. State v. Phipps, 31 P. 1097 (Kan. 1893) (affirming the convictions of two insurance 
agents for violating laws prohibiting unlawful trusts and combinations in restraint of trade); 
In re Pinkney, 27 P. 179, 180–81 (Kan. 1891). 
 352. Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 24 S.W. 397, 404 (Tex. 1893). 
 353. For a complete list of Department of Justice prosecutions under the Sherman Act 
through 1911, see GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, SHERMAN ANTITRUST LAW WITH AMENDMENTS 
(1911). 
 354. For a review of antitrust enforcement during Harrison’s tenure as president, see 
HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF 
JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 317–21 (1937); William Letwin, The First Decade of 
the Sherman Act: Early Administration, 68 YALE L.J. 464, 468–76 (1959). 
 355. No. 38 (C.C.E.D. Pa. filed Mar. 4, 1892), dismissed, 60 F. 306 (C.C.E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 
60 F. 934 (3d Cir. 1894), aff’d, United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 356. United States v. Greenhut, No. 461 (D. Mass. filed Feb. 23, 1892), indictment 
dismissed, 50 F. 469 (D. Mass. 1892).  There were three associated cases where the 
government sought removal of out-of-state defendants to Boston to answer the indictment.  
In each case, the petition for removal was denied. See In re Greene, 52 F. 104 (C.C.S.D. 
Ohio 1892); In re Terrell, 51 F. 213 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892); In re Corning, 51 F. 205 (N.D. 
Ohio 1892). 
 357. United States v. Patterson, No. 1215 (C.C.D. Mass. filed July 2 and Oct. 5, 1892), 
indictment dismissed in part, 55 F. 605 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893), nolle prosequi, (C.C.D. Mass. 
Nov. 10, 1894), reprinted in DECREES AND JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST CASES, JULY 
2, 1890–JANUARY 1, 1918, at 680 (Roger Shale ed., 1918). 
 358. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, No. 6799 (C.C.D. Kan. filed Jan. 6, 1892), 
dismissed, 53 F. 440 (C.C.D. Kan. 1892), aff’d, 58 F. 58 (8th Cir. 1893), complaint 
reinstated and combination enjoined, 166 U.S. 290, combination dissolved and enjoined, 
(C.C.D. Kan. June 7, 1897), reprinted in DECREES AND JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST 
CASES, supra note 357, at 6. 
 359. United States v. Nelson, No. 1408 (C.C.D. Minn. filed Jan. 20, 1892), dismissed, 
52 F. 646 (D. Minn. 1892). 
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leaders involved in the General Strike of 1892 in New Orleans.360  By the 
time Harrison left office, however, the government had succeeded on the 
merits in only one minor price-fixing case,361 although the Supreme Court 
later reversed the dismissal of one civil case and enjoined the respondent’s 
continued operation.362   
Federal antitrust enforcement continued at this very slow pace through 
the next two administrations.  The Department of Justice initiated eight 
actions in the Cleveland Administration (1893–1897) and only three in the 
McKinley Administration (1897–1901).  It was not until the Roosevelt 
Administration (1901–1909) that there was a meaningful increase in 
Sherman Act enforcement actions. 
 
Table 4.  Department of Justice Actions by Administration363 
  Indictments Equity Other Total 
Benjamin Harrison 1889–1893 3 4  7 
Grover Cleveland 1893–1897 2 4 2 8 
William McKinley 1897–1901  3  3 
Theodore Roosevelt 1901–1909 25 18 1 44 
William Howard Taft 1909–1913 39 27  66 
 
Why was the number of Department of Justice actions so low in the early 
years?  One factor was certainly the limitation on subject matter jurisdiction 
imposed by the contemporary judicial interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause, especially after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
E.C. Knight Co.364  But this fails to explain why prosecutors did not attempt 
a more artful pleading of restraints on interstate commerce in more cases 
given the large number of combinations operating across state lines.  
Another factor may have been the perceived limitations on applying the 
prohibitions of the Sherman Act in an ex post facto manner, which 
concerned the court in In re Greene.365  Here, too, one would think that 
aggressive prosecutors would bring more cases to try to find ways to plead 
around the problem and establish more favorable precedent, even if in the 
end they were unsuccessful. 
 
 
 360. United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, No. 12143 
(C.C.E.D. La. filed Nov. 10, 1892), injunction entered, 54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893), aff’d, 
57 F. 85 (5th Cir. 1893). 
 361. United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal & Coke Co., No. 2820 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 
13, 1890), declared illegal, 46 F. 432 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1891), enjoined, (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 
June 17, 1891), reprinted in DECREES AND JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST CASES, supra 
note 357, at 1. 
 362. Trans-Mo. 166 U.S. 290. 
 363. These statistics were compiled largely from COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., THE 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS WITH SUMMARY OF CASES INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED STATES 
1890–1951 (1952).  
 364. 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see In re Greene, 52 F. 104, 112–13 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892). 
 365. See In re Greene, 52 F. at 112. 
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Figure 4.  Department of Justice Actions Initiated by Year366 
 
 
Limited enforcement resources, no doubt, were a major problem.  When 
Congress passed the Sherman Act it created no special unit to enforce the 
antitrust laws and appropriated no funds specifically for antitrust 
enforcement.367  In 1890, for example, there were eighteen lawyers in the 
Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., overwhelmed with cases.368  
Although there were many more district attorneys, they were paid a fixed 
salary of $200 per year plus fees paid by the government based on their 
caseload.369  Antitrust cases, which presented difficulties simply because of 
their novelty, were unlikely to attract much enthusiasm under this incentive 
structure.  Moreover, especially when the large combinations were likely to 
vigorously defend against any antitrust action, as they did in the actions 
against the Whiskey, Sugar, and Cash Register Trusts, neither state nor 
federal enforcement officials had much incentive to devote their limited 
time and resources to challenging combinations in the absence of any 
material public pressure.370  And while some newspapers continued to rail 
against the trusts, for the most part the public was relatively acquiescent.371 
 
 366. See COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, supra note 363; Richard A. Posner, A Statistical 
Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366 (1970). 
 367. See Letwin, supra note 354, at 466–68 (describing the “poverty” of the Department 
of Justice in resources and manpower in the 1890s). See generally 1893 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. 
REP.; 1892 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP.; 1891 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP.   
 368. Letwin, supra note 354, at 466. 
 368. Id.  
 369. Id. at 467.  For a criticism of the fee system by former a attorney general, see 
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 354, at 493 (“However, by far the greatest evil which 
beset the administration of federal justice in the nineteenth century was the fee system for 
the compensation for local federal officers.”).  The fee system was abolished in 1896. Id. at 
494. 
 370. On the public perceptions of the trusts at the time, see LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE PUBLIC 
IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICA, 1880–1940, at 47–78 (1975). 
 371. Of course, another possibility was that the Department of Justice and the district 
attorneys simply shirked their responsibilities. See Mr. Edmunds on Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 25, 1892, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F00C15
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This all changed by the beginning of the next decade.  Beginning with 
the Panic of 1893, the country entered into its most severe economic 
depression to that date.372  Marked by violent strikes and unemployment 
rates that exceeded 10 percent in at least five years,373 the decade saw an 
enormous number of business failures.  These same pressures brought a 
further round of combinations.  In the aftermath of the depression, over 
1800 firms were absorbed into horizontal consolidations of at least five 
competing firms.374  This merger wave produced such giants as U.S. Steel, 
American Tobacco, International Harvester, Du Pont, Corn Products, 
Anaconda Copper, and American Smelting and Refining.375  Antitrust 
enforcement, which became funded in 1903, responded with a new vigor, 
but that is another story.  
 
F93C5F1B738DDDAC0A94D9415B8285F0D3 (quoting Senator Edmunds as saying that 
“[t]he law is all right, the courts are all right, and the people are all right.  Let the officers 
charged with the enforcement of the law do their full duty and Trusts and combinations will 
go to pieces as quickly as they sprang into existence”).  
 372. See generally ROBERT HIGGS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 
1865–1914 (1971); CHARLES HOFFMANN, THE DEPRESSION OF THE NINETIES:  AN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY (1970); DOUGLAS STEEPLES & DAVID O. WHITTEN, DEMOCRACY IN DESPERATION:  
THE DEPRESSION OF 1893 (1998). 
 373. Christina Romer, Spurious Volatility in Historical Unemployment Data, 94 J. POL. 
ECON. 1, 31 (1986). 
 374. LAMOREAUX, supra note 29, at 2. 
 375. RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1895–1956, at 34 
(1959). 
